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Sweeping assertions of exclusive trademark rights in brand names and
images can impede competition and chill free expression, including fictional
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to litigation threats, even when the substance of the legal claims they face is
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“fair use” doctrines are not simple defenses that end suits quickly and cheaply,
and many defendants cannot bear the resulting costs of protracted litigation.
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Observers have proposed a variety of improvements to trademark fair use,
but this Article focuses intensively on the decisionmaking structure of
trademark law and ways to reduce its burdensome effects. The analysis draws
on theoretical and doctrinal literature about administrative and error costs,
rules and standards, and the design of defensive doctrines. Building on this
foundation, the Article argues that reform of trademark fair use should
emphasize the reduction of administrative costs and the risk of erroneous
findings of liability for speech; should favor clear ex ante rules over more
complex ex post standards; and should strive to separate consideration of fair
use from the adjudication of the prima facie likelihood of confusion case. It
then proposes categorical safe harbors for certain uses of trademarks as a
central innovation, complemented by other broader presumptions against
infringement for expressive uses. The Appendix contains draft language meant
to start the discussion about such defenses.
Traditionally, trademark law has eschewed per se exceptions. Much of its
design assumes that avoidance of consumer confusion is imperative, even if
high administrative costs and unpredictability result. However, this Article
shows that trademark law can reduce administrative costs and improve
protection of free speech without an unacceptable increase in the likelihood of
consumer confusion. While safe harbors alone cannot resolve every case
involving competition or speech interests, at least they prevent the easy cases
from contributing to the chilling effect. More generally, the analysis here
demonstrates that categorical defenses deserve a greater role in the
adjudication of trademark disputes.
INTRODUCTION
Trademarks are everywhere. That becomes truer than ever as the law
steadily expands the scope of trademark rights, and as our society plasters
brand names on every available surface.
Meaningful communication
increasingly requires the use of these legally protected words and symbols –
for competition, realistic portrayals of our surroundings, commentary about
companies or products, evocative expression, or simply identifying what we
are talking about. Unfortunately, existing “trademark fair use” doctrines
protect these valuable forms of speech inadequately. This Article proposes
pragmatic reform, centered on exemptions from liability for uses of trademarks
in certain categories, and presumptions favoring free speech for other
expressive uses.
A Westlaw search turns up plentiful examples of litigation over the use of
trademarks to express a broader message, beyond simply presenting a brand
name to the consumer.1 Most litigation about such “expressive uses” that
1

I just used a trademark in that sentence. See WESTLAW, Registration No. 1,591,846
(registering WESTLAW for law-related computer programs and publications). They are
unavoidable. There are multiple recent examples of litigation concerning expressive uses.
See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008);

2010]

TRADEMARK FAIR USE REFORM ACT

2269

reached judgment in the last decade or so resulted in decisions that preserved
the right to use trademarks for communication, even when the use was
unrelated to the traditional purposes of brand identification.2 But defending
against such suits is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Despite the
positive trend in ultimate results, significant evidence shows that threats of suit
in these situations remain frequent and effective.3 Decided cases are a small
and seemingly unrepresentative sample of overall disputes involving free
speech and trademarks. For every speaker who fights back in court, countless
others cautiously back away.4
Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2009);
Roxbury Entm’t v. Penthouse Media Grp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007);
Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
2 See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 59-61
(2008). I define “expressive uses” as those that “convey an articulable message rather than,
or in addition to, the traditional function of source identification.” Id. at 54; accord
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400 (1990).
3 See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007) (describing how “trademark users who could mount a
decent defense against an infringement claim nevertheless choose to seek a license”);
Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 585, 589-90 (2008) (discussing how “cease and desist” letters allow trademark holders
“to expand their trademark rights” even when a case has no merit); Jennifer E. Rothman,
The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1909-16
(2007) (making similar observations across types of intellectual property); Patricia
Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance
Culture for Documentary Filmmakers, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, AM. UNIV., 9-10 (Nov. 2004),
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf;
Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Will Fair Use Survive?: Free Expression in the Age of
Copyright Control, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 35-36 (Nov. 16,
2005), http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV.
413, 416-17 (2010) (discussing Major League Baseball’s practice of threatening suit against
Little League teams using names of major league teams, prompting the Little League teams
to change their names); Michael Cieply, Despite Big Names, Prestige Film Falls Through,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at B1 (reporting how Major League Baseball purports to control
content of films or television programming depicting actual teams); Sara Lipka, PG-13?
Not This College. Or That One. Or . . ., CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 26, 2009, at A1
(describing how film and television producers seek permission from colleges and
universities when using their names or logos); Shaun Spalding, Bros Icing Bros – A Case for
Copyright Bullying by Overreaching Smirnoff Lawyers, NEW MEDIA RIGHTS (June 21, 2010,
5:26 PM), http://www.newmediarights.org/copyright/bros_icing_bros_case_copyright_
bullying_overreaching_smirnoff_lawyers (discussing possibility that a threat of suit by
Smirnoff resulted in the demise of a web site dedicated to a drinking game involving
Smirnoff Ice flavored malt beverages). Cf. Trademark Technical and Conforming
Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, § 4, 124 Stat. 66, 70 (requiring the Secretary
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Courts and commentators have proposed various reforms to address this
conflict between free speech and trademark rights. A number of highlyregarded scholars have advocated a more rigorous “trademark use”
requirement, so that defendants would be liable only if they used the plaintiff’s
mark “as a mark” in some fashion.5 A different strategy would impose more
robust “materiality” requirements, so that only uses that directly influence
purchasing decisions would be viewed as causing the harm necessary for
infringement.6 Others would refine the existing First Amendment defense7 or
nominative use doctrine.8 Still others prefer a more sensitive application of the
“likelihood of confusion” test to protect free speech.9 And many scholars want
to reverse particular expansions of trademark scope that can produce conflicts
with expression.10

of Commerce to study and report on “the extent to which small businesses may be harmed
by litigation tactics by corporations attempting to enforce trademark rights beyond a
reasonable interpretation of the scope of the rights granted to the trademark owner”). For
more on this chilling effect, see infra Part I (discussing the tendency of mark users to seek
licensing for marks rather than risk litigation).
5 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark
Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404,
414-24 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Margreth Barrett, Reconciling
Fair Use and Trademark Use, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 56-60 (2010); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 805-11 (2004); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of
Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 621-25 (2004).
6 See, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 441-43 (discussing risk of curtailing
free expression absent a doctrinal or statutory fair use defense in trademark infringement);
Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False
Advertising Law, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/rebecca_tushnet/9/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
7 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV.
887, 922-32 (2005); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use
in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1073-80 (2009); Aaron F. Jaroff, Note, Big Boi,
Barbie, Dr. Seuss, and the King: Expanding the Constitutional Protections for the Satirical
Use of Famous Trademarks, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 641, 672-79 (2008); see also Lisa P.
Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381,
385-86 (2008) (arguing that adherence to First Amendment doctrine would require more
searching constitutional analysis and significant changes to trademark law).
8 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222-24 (3d Cir.
2005).
9 See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2010); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free
Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 203 (2004).
10 See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark
Policies and Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 176-81 (2008); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1731-35 (1999);
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These ideas all merit discussion, and they are not mutually exclusive of one
another. We could adopt a stricter materiality standard and also refine the First
Amendment defense, for instance. Unfortunately, many proposals also share
the same problem with existing law: they focus on fine-tuning doctrine to
reach ideal outcomes instead of on reducing the cost and length of litigation.
In previous works, I argued that key goals for reform include increasing the
predictability and clarity of trademark fair use and making adjudication faster
and less expensive.11 To be fully effective, changes in trademark law also
must keep these goals at the forefront.
This Article pays particular attention to the decisionmaking structure of
trademark litigation. Structural characteristics fuel the pre-litigation posturing
and settlement that cause most of the chilling effect on speech. In response,
this Article recommends categorical exemptions as a first step toward reform
of trademark fair use. We should develop simpler rules, fashioned to allow
fast resolution of especially common and troubling types of threats to
expressive use. At least within the covered categories, such bright-line
exemptions address the pre-litigation chilling effect more directly than do other
suggested reforms.
The resulting safe harbors would complement, rather than displace, other
existing and proposed safeguards for expressive uses of trademarks. Broader
and more amorphous standards, including some of those in current law, should
form a second line of defense for use in trickier cases that fall outside the
exempted categories.12 The recognition of speech-protective presumptions in
fair use cases could further augment these standards. Without some clear-cut
per se rules, however, empty litigation threats will maintain their power to curb
competition and squelch speech, even where trademark claims should fail on
the merits. A combination of approaches would repair major flaws of existing
trademark fair use doctrine and reduce (although of course not eliminate)
trademark law’s constraint on free speech.
Part I of this Article summarizes the inadequacy of the existing doctrinal
structure. In addition to recapping my analysis in earlier work, this Part
elaborates on the asymmetric incentives of plaintiffs and defendants.13 Often,
a markholder has an intense interest in maintaining control over a trademark’s
meaning and reputation, while other speakers will feel less strongly about
using the mark.

Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095,
1146 (2003).
11 William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1214-23 (2008); see also McGeveran, supra note 2,
at 61-66.
12 See infra Part III.C.
13 Although there are declaratory judgment cases and counterclaims in which the alleged
infringer is the plaintiff, unless otherwise indicated this Article assumes the more typical
situation involving a defendant’s allegedly infringing uses of a plaintiff’s mark.
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In Part II, the Article turns from problems to solutions. It discusses three
strategic choices about the design of speech protection under trademark law.
First, this Part evaluates the current imbalances between administrative costs
and error costs, and between different types of error. Compared to existing
law, a reformed trademark fair use doctrine should reduce administrative costs
and should tolerate a somewhat increased possibility of false negatives.
Second, this Part advocates more specific rule-like features that allow ex ante
assessments of potential liability, in place of the more general standards for fair
use that courts now apply ex post. Finally, this Part calls for separation of fair
use into an independent analysis, in place of trademark law’s common practice
of bundling most interests in speech and competition together with the
fundamental inquiry into likelihood of confusion.
Finally, Part III offers an explanatory tour through draft legislative language
implementing these changes, which can be found in an Appendix. The
proposal combines categorical exemptions, existing doctrine, and rebuttable
presumptions. Part III shows how these structures respond to the problems
explained in Part I and how they embody the design choices made in Part II.
Of course, like any legislative proposal, reasonable differences of opinion
about the details are to be expected; this Article does not seek to replicate the
intensive debates about drafting that one might see in a congressional
subcommittee markup. As explained further in Part III, statutory text makes it
easier to present and analyze the proposals here, regardless of whether reform
eventually comes from Congress or from the courts. The broad goal of the
discussion is to test drive an alternative structural design that works better than
the broken-down jalopy of existing trademark fair use.
I.

THE PROBLEM

A combination of legal, cultural, and technological changes has made
conflict between trademark protection and free speech more frequent and more
significant in recent years. Legally, both the legislative and judicial branches
have contributed to a dramatic long-term expansion of the scope of trademark
rights.14 Trademark rights now extend to a dizzying array of products and
features.15 Trademarks also confer protection against a much broader array of

14 See generally, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 2; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4; Litman,
supra note 10; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999);
Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1839 (2007).
15 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992) (finding
trademark protection in features of a restaurant’s “festive eating atmosphere”); Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 79-80 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming injunction
against distribution of “look-alike” Rubik’s Cube puzzles); House of Hunan, Inc. v. Hunan
at Pavilion, No. 85-1591, 1985 WL 72671, at *2-4, *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1986) (finding
substantial likelihood that Chinese restaurant’s use of white marble lions at its entrance had
secondary meaning, and enjoining competitor’s use of identical lions); In re Clarke, 17
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unlicensed uses than the archetypal competitor deceiving purchasers by
passing off its goods as the markholder’s.16 This transformation of trademark
law often reflects modern marketing realities, and it is justified in many cases.
However, some lawyers charged with policing their clients’ trademark
portfolios now send threatening “cease and desist” letters (C&Ds) as a routine
response to virtually any unauthorized use of a mark.17 In addition to deterring
the individual recipients, these legal threats also serve a broader signaling
function by warning against all unauthorized uses of a mark.18 Over time,
broad claims have begun to redefine public understanding of the nature of
trademark ownership, which ultimately shapes those rights through the
“feedback effect” of consumer perception.19

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding “high impact, fresh, floral
fragrance reminiscent of Plumeria blossoms” registrable as a mark for sewing thread); TM
Registration No. 2,519,203 (registration for Jolly Green Giant’s distinctive descending “HoHo-Ho” laugh as a mark for canned and frozen vegetables); Joseph C. Daniels, Note, The
Branding of America: The Rise of Geographic Trademarks and the Need for a Strong Fair
Use Defense, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1721-28 (2009) (discussing increase in trademark
protection for designations of geographic locations).
16 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 416-22; see also, e.g., Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v.
JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming injunction against use of
mark “eVisa” for multilingual education and business services as likely to cause dilution by
blurring of the mark Visa for financial services); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney &
Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that competing marks may give rise
to post-sale confusion where the differences between them are not “likely to be memorable
enough to dispel confusion on serial viewing”); Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d
1228, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding initial interest confusion, and infringement, where
defendants used plaintiff’s trademarks in “attempts to divert traffic to Defendant’s Web
sites”); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding
infringement where defendant’s t-shirt design “so resemble[d plaintiff’s] marks that it is
likely to cause confusion among consumers as to whether [plaintiff had] sponsored,
endorsed, or [was] otherwise affiliated with the design”).
17 See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1838-42 (2007); Port, supra note 3, at 589-90; Steve Stecklow, The
Scariest Monster of All Sues for Trademark Infringement, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2009, at A1
(discussing the variety of noncompeting markets in which Monster Cable Products Inc. has
challenged the use of “MONSTER” as a mark).
18 Cf. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 521 (2003) (discussing how anti-competitive suits
also can deter other uses of intellectual property).
19 See Gibson, supra note 3, at 907-27 (observing how the overcautious licensing of
marks where no license is needed creates a consumer perception that a license is, in fact,
needed, which in turn creates grounds to find likelihood of confusion where no grounds
existed before); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 773, 774 & n.4 (2009) (“Consumer expectations largely define trademark rights, yet
those expectations are influenced by consumers’ understanding (or misunderstanding) of the
law.”).
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Meanwhile, the growing ubiquity of branding – the very trend that has
fueled this expansion of trademark law – makes third-party use of trademarks
more essential to open discourse than ever before. No representation of the
modern world would be accurate unless it were saturated with marketing
Discussion or critique of products or corporate behavior
symbols.20
necessitates use of associated trademarks.21 Competitors, retailers, and repair
services often need to refer to one another’s marks as a way of explaining their
goods and services to the public.22 More broadly, trademarks often provide the
“most vivid metaphors” and “most compelling imagery” available, precisely
because they are “selected for their effervescent qualities, and then injected
into the stream of communication with the pressure of a fire hose by means of
mass media campaigns.”23
Finally, the advent of the internet and other networked communication
technology makes it possible for an individual to duplicate (and alter) content,

20 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 400-12 (tracing the growth of partially expressive thirdparty uses of trademarks); Litman, supra note 10, at 1725-28 (tracking an increase in the
intrinsic value of branding and marketing in American commerce and culture); Daniel E.
Newman, Portraying a Branded World, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 357, 357-61 (2008)
(observing the glaring absence of trademarks from movies and television shows, leading the
general public to believe that such marks only appear as the result of licensing or product
placement).
21 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir.
1992) (“Much useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if
speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a
person, company or product by using its trademark.”); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,
Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing risk that “a corporation could shield itself
from criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct”);
Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 909 (discussing “the fundamental importance of free
expression and its contribution to a ‘vibrant cultural commons’” (citation omitted)).
22 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1180-82, (9th
Cir. 2010) (allowing automobile broker specializing in facilitating Lexus purchases to use
LEXUS mark as part of domain name); McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners,
LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 368-69 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Arguably . . . , store brands can ‘get away’ with
a little more similarity than other defendants’ products when they display prominently a
well-known label, e.g., a store-specific signature, on their packages, but they cannot copy
the national brands to such a degree of similarity, then merely affix a tiny differentiating
label, as to become entirely immune to infringement actions.”); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of
Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 2004) (permitting defendant vacuum repair shop
to use plaintiff vacuum manufacturer’s mark in its advertisements); August Storck K.G. v.
Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (truthful use of a mark in comparative
labeling is “a form of competition highly beneficial to consumers”).
23 Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 (1993); cf. DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 90 (Dolphin Books 1961) (1739) (“I would willingly
establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression
becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but
likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.”).
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including trademarks, and then broadcast those uses to the entire world.24
Simultaneously, this same technology allows markholders to search for those
uses, find them, and trace them back to a potential defendant.25
Although these changes in law, culture, and technology probably have
increased the number of disputes over expressive use of trademarks, final
judicial dispositions in those disputes do not favor markholders.26 To be sure,
there are outlier cases where courts rule for markholders,27 but ultimate
judgments more often favor speech interests in the few cases to reach that
point.
The main problem is not the eventual outcome, but the route to get there,
which is uncertain, lengthy, and expensive. Courts choose from a grab bag of
doctrines related to “fair use,” configured somewhat differently in various
jurisdictions.28 These doctrines often entail fact-intensive inquiries that require

24 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 105-06 (2004).
25 See,
e.g., California ULTRA Spyder Solutions, CAL. ULTRA SPYDER,
http://www.cuspyder.com/index.php?sect=solutions (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (describing
automated online service to help markholders track use of trademarks, including the ability
to “[d]etermine which resellers, consumer associations, and unauthorized parties are using
Company brands”); MarkMonitor Brand Protection, MARKMONITOR, http://www.markmoni
tor.com/products/brand-protection.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (“Brand owners can
rapidly detect abuses as they occur, then respond quickly and effectively with automated
enforcement mechanisms including . . . cease & desist letters and site takedown advisories
to ISPs.”).
26 See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 59-61.
27 See, e.g., Jones Day v. Blockshopper LLC, No. 08 CV 4572, 2008 WL 4925644, at *34 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2008). Some other pro-plaintiff decisions are overturned on appeal.
See Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 902-06 (9th Cir. 2007), vacating No. CV
06-173 (D. Ariz. May 11, 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction).
28 These include: “trademark use” theory, see generally sources cited supra note 5; the
§33(b)(4) defense for descriptive uses, see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000); KP Permanent
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117-21 (2004); the nominative
fair use doctrine, see New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 30708 (9th Cir. 1992); various First Amendment balancing tests, see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); Kerry L. Timbers & Julia Huston, The “Artistic Relevance
Test” Just Became Relevant: The Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense
to Trademark Infringement and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1278, 1291-99 (2003)
(tracing the adoption and expansion of the Rogers test by other circuits); and safe harbors
under the federal trademark dilution statute, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3) (West 2006)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000)); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d
894, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2002). See generally McGeveran, supra note 2, at 77-109. There are
some similar problems of inconsistency in the application of fair use to cybersquatting
cases, which are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Monique Bradley Lampke,
Why the Fair Use Defense of Free Speech or Parody Under the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act Needs Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 11
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 267 (2010).
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time and money to litigate. On close examination, most of them collapse into
the same inquiry about likelihood of consumer confusion that drives all
trademark litigation, robbing them of much value as shortcuts.29
In response to the risk of litigation – not the risk of liability – rational actors,
including large institutions such as Hollywood studios or insurance companies,
adopt risk-averse policies concerning the unauthorized use of trademarks. The
effort to avoid these conflicts adds significant costs to the production of artistic
expression or commentary.30 In addition to the monetary costs of rights
clearance and licensing, this excessive caution also constrains expressive
choices, stifles open competition, and reduces the quality of speech and
entertainment for its consumers – that is, for all of us. But many institutions
have determined that the potential cost of defending a lawsuit is too high, even
when discounted for the low likelihood of getting sued and the very low
likelihood of paying damages. When speakers use unlicensed marks in speech
despite these dangers, they typically capitulate and withdraw the use if they
receive a C&D.
It is bad enough that the structure of existing trademark fair use doctrines
imposes such significant difficulties and costs on expressive uses of
trademarks. Asymmetric incentives further enhance markholders’ influence.
For consumer-oriented companies, brands are among the most cherished
possessions.31 BusinessWeek’s ranking of the top 100 global brands includes
thirty-six with estimated values in excess of $10 billion, all the way up to the
storied Coca-Cola brand, worth more than $66 billion.32 Brand equity now
represents a substantial portion of the valuation of many companies, formally
recognized by accounting rules and capable of serving as an asset, as security,
and as one of the most important components in business transactions.33 Most
29

See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 112-13.
See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 1039.
31 See MICHAEL LEVINE, A BRANDED WORLD: ADVENTURES IN PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
THE CREATION OF SUPERBRANDS 4 (2003) (“Branding brings about so many benefits it
reminds me of the saying, ‘You can count the number of seeds in an apple, but you can’t
count the number of apples in a seed.’”); Vithala R. Rao et al., How Is Manifest Branding
Strategy Related to the Intangible Value of a Corporation?, J. MARKETING, Oct. 2004, at
126, 126 (“Highly competitive markets make powerful brands essential to accomplishing
growth. . . . Brands have been widely acknowledged as having a financial value because
they are able to generate future cash flows.”); Kelvin King, The Value of Intellectual
Property, Intangible Assets and Goodwill, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/value_ip_intangible_assets.htm (last visited Aug.
11, 2010) (“Intellectual capital is recognized as the most important asset of many of the
world’s largest and most powerful companies; it is the foundation for the market dominance
and continuing profitability of leading corporations. It is often the key objective in mergers
and acquisitions . . . .”).
32 100 Best Global Brands, BUSINESSWEEK, http://www.businessweek.com/interactive_
reports/best_global_brands_2009.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2010).
33 See CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 119-21 (2004);
30
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large markholders police their portfolio systematically and become repeat
players in trademark disputes – perhaps litigating over marks, but certainly
issuing C&Ds. Brand managers and their trademark attorneys define their
professional success by protecting and strengthening the value of these assets.
They have little reason to restrain themselves from making the maximum
possible claim of exclusive rights. In fact, common understanding (or
misunderstanding) of trademark law encourages them to do so.34
On the other hand, few defendants would consider their ability to refer to
particular trademarks to be central to their life’s work.35 Sometimes the mark,
even if helpful, is not essential to the message they want to convey. Even
when it is essential, their attachment to using the mark usually is weaker than a
markholder’s desire to control the mark. Many would-be users of marks are
not repeat players in the system.36 Unlike marketers who expend huge sums to
promote brands, ordinary individuals who use marks for purposes of art or
consumer commentary need little or no investment to do so.37 These
Intellectual Property for Business, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wi
po.int/sme/en/ip_business/index.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2010) (providing resources for
small and medium-sized enterprises to help them understand and manage their intellectual
property); Valuation of Intellectual Property: What, Why and How, WIPO MAGAZINE,
Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 5, available at http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents /wipo_
magazine/09_2003.pdf.
34 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1207
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[T]rademark law not only encourages but requires one to be vigilant on
pain of losing exclusive rights.”). This offhand judicial remark and others like it exaggerate
the importance of monitoring and controlling unlicensed uses of a mark. See Desai &
Rierson, supra note 17, at 1834-38. Some lawyers and consultants seem to cite such
statements to stoke fear among markholders that they must aggressively police and enforce
rights against any and all unauthorized uses. See, e.g., Mark J. Ingber, Why Your Company
May Need an Intellectual Property Audit, INGBER & GELBER, LLP,
http://www.ingberiplawyer.com/WHY%20YOUR%20COMPANY%20MAY%20NEED%2
0AN%20INTELLECTUAL%20PROPERTY%20AUDIT.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2010)
(“Anyone who uses your client’s mark or a derivation of it without a license will have to be
stopped from doing so. If they are not, the mark’s legal status may be in jeopardy.”).
35 See, e.g., Kathy Stephenson, Dough Girl Not Fighting the Big Boys, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Aug. 4, 2010 (discussing owner who decided to change name of “My Dough Girl”
bakery after receiving a cease and desist letter from the owner of Pillsbury’s DOUGH BOY
mark, and who stated, “I have to stick to baking so cookies can still be a part of all our
futures. . . . If the Dough Girl fights, there will be no cookies”).
36 Cf. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 335, 349 (2005) (discussing asymmetry in cybertort law between repeat corporate
players who have “extensive financial and legal resources” and consumers as the “classic
example of ‘one-shotters’” who generally lose in litigation).
37 See Boris Shapiro, Note, Trademark Arbitration: A First Rate Change for a Second
Life Future, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. 273, 288 (2009) (“[A]nyone who owns a computer with an
Internet connection has the tools to infringe upon a trademark.”); Sherif Abdou, 10+
Websites That Offer Free Blog Hosting, THE DESIGN BLOG (Jan. 26, 2009),
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individuals typically lack expertise about trademark law and often lack the
resources to obtain legal advice.38
Some institutional defendants, such as movie studios or book publishers, do
qualify as repeat players insofar as they produce works that include expressive
uses of trademarks. Indeed, many of the unrepresentative cases that reach
litigation involve such defendants.39 This may be attributed to some
combination of their deeper pockets; their desire, as repeat players themselves,
not to be seen as vulnerable to rent-seeking licensing demands in the future;40
and their greater resources and legal expertise to mount a defense. The
primary goal of these defendants, however, is to distribute profitable content.
Because licensing a mark or omitting it altogether often advances this goal just
as effectively as an unauthorized expressive use, many of them rationally
choose these alternatives in order to avoid costly conflicts with markholders.41
Because of these differences, plaintiffs typically have much stronger reasons
than do defendants to push for their desired outcome. To some extent,
asymmetric incentives are built in to the nature of the typical conflict over an
expressive use. The law certainly cannot force speakers to persist when they
choose otherwise. For that matter, many litigation threats outside of trademark
law also play out against a backdrop of unequal resources and differing
appetites for a lawsuit. Admittedly, no amount of amending the Lanham Act42
can overcome disparities inherent in the private adversarial system.43
Yet improvement is possible. Reform can improve defendants’ positions by
making litigation shorter, less expensive, and more predictable. These are
precisely the variables that discourage them from asserting fair use rights more
forcefully. Simultaneously, such reform also strengthens the defendant’s hand
in negotiation with a plaintiff markholder – rather than a complex bundle of
http://sherifabdou.com/2009/01/10-websites-that-offer-free-blog-hosting/ (listing multiple
platforms that allow users to post blogs for free).
38 Shapiro, supra note 37, at 287. While some insurance may cover defense costs, many
business policies exclude trademark coverage and many individuals will lack relevant
insurance altogether.
39 See, e.g. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.
2008); Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007);
Wham-O, Inc v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d. 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Fox
News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6162(RLC), 2003 WL
23281520 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 20, 2003).
40 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267 (1987).
41 Cf. Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement
Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1855-58 (2004) (describing
the problem of civil plaintiffs filing meritless suits, and the economics and strategy behind a
defendant’s decision to settle such suits).
42
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1129 (2006).
43 Cf. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 67-103 (1988) (probing
the various justifications for an adversary legal system).

2010]

TRADEMARK FAIR USE REFORM ACT

2279

doctrines, a defendant can cite a simple rule and assert that it decimates the
plaintiff’s claim. Changes in the procedural structure of trademark fair use will
increase the proportion of defendants willing to push back, and reduce the
frequency of meritless claims by markholders. In the aggregate, these changes
can also reverse the one-way ratchet in trademark law toward consumer
expectations of ever broader trademark rights.44
II.

DESIGN CHOICES

This Part explains and analyzes three theoretical considerations that should
influence the design of new trademark fair use doctrine. First, the proposal
ought to emphasize the reduction of administrative costs, even if simplified
decisionmaking may somewhat increase error costs from false negatives.
Second, fair use should favor clearly stated rules over more general standards.
Finally, as much as possible, reform should be embedded in defenses and
exemptions rather than in elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case
demonstrating likelihood of confusion.
A.

Emphasis on Administrative Costs and False Positives

Many legal scholars have borrowed a “decision theory” model from
economists to evaluate the optimal form of legal commands.45 While most
judges46 and other policymakers may not recognize it explicitly as the
theoretical basis for their design choices, this framework offers great
explanatory and normative force as an evaluative tool.47 Decision theory
suggests that in all subject areas, two types of costs are associated with the
structure of legal doctrine: administrative costs (also sometimes called legal
process costs or information costs) and error costs.48
44

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 272 (1974); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 43-45 (2000); Mark S. Popofsky,
Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle
Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 448-49 (2006).
46 Occasionally judges do recognize this trade-off explicitly, especially in antitrust cases.
See, e.g., Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Rules have lower
administrative costs and will be preferable unless they increase the error costs (the sum of
false positives and false negatives) by more than the savings in administrative costs.”);
Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Given the
high error cost of finding companies liable for cutting prices to the consumer, the court
should thus refuse to infer predation.”); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del. 2006) (discussing error costs in the context of antitrust law).
47 See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099,
2103 (2004); McGeveran, supra note 2, at 113-15.
48 See C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules,
67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 46 (1999) (“In evaluating investment in information, the benefit of
additional information is that it may reduce the likelihood of making a costly erroneous
45
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Administrative costs are the costs of making a decision.49 Examples of
administrative costs in expressive use cases might include the cost of
empanelling a jury, or the cost of commissioning a survey to determine
whether a mark has secondary meaning. Error costs are the costs arising from
incorrect outcomes (presumably judged incorrect by some independent
normative standard50). In general, administrative costs and error costs are
inversely proportional – more elaborate decisionmaking procedures require
greater effort but should yield fewer mistakes, and vice versa.51 Error costs
come in two forms. False positives, or Type I errors, occur when an
adjudicator imposes liability where it should not apply; false negatives, or
Type II errors, occur when an adjudicator fails to impose liability that should
apply.52 Different legal structures may increase the risk of one or the other
form of error. Doctrinal design must navigate both of these tradeoffs: first
between administrative and error costs, and second between different types of
error. In principle, the correct balance should account for the gravity and
frequency of potential errors.53
Criminal law illustrates these propositions well. Because a faulty result
could wrongly deprive an innocent person of liberty or allow a criminal to get
away, we have established many procedures to prevent error, even though they
drive up administrative costs considerably.54 Within the category of error
decision. In this sense, the decision to consider additional information can be seen as a
tradeoff between two types of costs – error costs on the one hand and information costs on
the other.”); Bone, supra note 47, at 2123-24; Popofsky, supra note 45, at 448-49 ; Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399, 400-01 (1973).
49 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost
Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1147 (2005) (listing
administrative costs “such as judicial salaries, legal fees, and discovery”); Howard A.
Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 19 (2001) (identifying, in the antitrust context, “administrative costs, monitoring
costs, and the misallocation of resources associated with rent-seeking activity”).
50 Clearly, that normative standard is crucial. In the context of trademark fair use, the
decisionmaking structure should strive to balance the public interest in free expression with
the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. As discussed at length in this Article,
this balance sometimes will be easy to predict in advance and at other times may require
more fine-grained analysis, but the structure should at least allow courts to confront the
question honestly, unlike current doctrine. See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 1207-11.
51 See Korobkin, supra note 45, at 42.
52 See Bone, supra note 47, at 2123-24.
53 See Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason: In
Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 776 (1998) (“A comparison of the
two kinds of mistakes will influence the nature and structure of legal rules.”).
54 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1197, 1212-13 (2007) (arguing that criminal procedure rules are often structured to
counteract a tendency toward false positives or false negatives built into the rule’s
substantive counterpart).
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costs, the famous “Blackstone’s Ratio” declares it “better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”55 – or, in the less poetic
language of the economist, false positives are more serious than false negatives
in criminal prosecutions. As a result, requirements for criminal prosecutions,
particularly the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for conviction,
concentrate on avoiding false positives more than false negatives, and they
place comparatively little emphasis on containing administrative costs.56
Similar determinations about the proper balance between administrative and
error costs, and between types of error risk, permeate many areas of law, from
antitrust57 to constitutional law58 to, of course, intellectual property.59
55 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1769); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-72 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (discussing error costs in criminal litigation and the importance of the “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (same);
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 239 & n.19 (3d Cir. 2004) (referring to
Blackstone’s Ratio in distinguishing false positives from false negatives in scientific
evidence); United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing “Blackstone’s
immortal words” as “a cardinal principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence”). See generally
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (charting history of
Blackstone’s Ratio and similar formulations).
56 See Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and
Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 889 n.280 (2007) (identifying the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard as reflecting the determination that “the cost of a false
conviction outweighs the cost of false acquittals”); Muris, supra note 53, at 776 (same).
57 See Beckner & Salop, supra note 48, at 42 (“[B]y adopting a decision theoretic
approach, or at least by recognizing the decision theoretic aspects of alternative antitrust
standards, regulatory commissions and courts can better understand the key role of
information in determining an appropriate antitrust standard.”); Arndt Christiansen &
Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per
Se Rules vs Rule of Reason”, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 215, 223 (2006) (“Both in antitrust law
and the general law and economics literature, the problem whether more general or specific
(precise) rules should be applied has been discussed from an economic point of view by
applying an ‘error cost approach.’”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1984) (citing Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,
234 (1st Cir. 1983)) (“The task, then, is to create simple rules that will filter the category of
probably-beneficial practices out of the legal system, leaving to assessment under the Rule
of Reason only those with significant risks of competitive injury.”); Frank H. Easterbrook,
On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 977 (1986) (explaining
that, in antitrust law, “the legal system must minimize the sum of error and process costs”);
Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for
Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937, 1986
(2009).
58 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative
Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181, 207 (1981) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979)
as an example of “the bureaucratic-rationality or ‘error costs’ approach to due process
questions that has been dominant since Mathews v. Eldridge”); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV.
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A unanimous Supreme Court explicitly considered this balance of costs in a
major trademark case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., where it
declared a per se rule that product design could not be inherently distinctive.60
Admittedly, the Court may have failed to establish as bright a line as it wanted,
because it underestimated the difficulty of reliably distinguishing a product’s
design from its packaging (which still may be inherently distinctive).61
Despite its arguably flawed solution, however, the Court’s assessment of the
problem was clear-eyed:
Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with
regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design
ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit
against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness. How
easy it is to mount a plausible suit depends, of course, upon the clarity of
the test for inherent distinctiveness . . . . Competition is deterred,
however, not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of
successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of inherently sourceidentifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.62
In other words, the Court believed the real-world probability of a false
negative (a finding of no liability for product design that was, in fact,
inherently distinctive) was low. This low error cost cannot justify the
overdeterrence of high administrative costs or the risk of anticompetitive false
positives. Even if a rare false negative might exist in theory, Justice Scalia
wrote in the opinion, the “game” of finding it was “not worth the candle.”63
1649, 1665 (2005) (discussing how, in situations where the necessary fact-finding would be
unduly cumbersome, the Supreme Court “substitute[s] a decision rule that turns on objective
and easily ascertainable factors”).
59 See Bone, supra note 47, at 2123-25; Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in
Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 489 (2006) (identifying
“adjudication cost” as one of “[t]wo possible justifications for IP law’s comparatively loose
conceptualization of ‘markets’ and ‘competition’”).
60 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
61 See In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stressing that while the WalMart Court provided guidance for close cases, it “did not recite the factors that distinguish
between product packaging and product design trade dress”); Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Walgreen
Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 125, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); McKernan v. Burek, 118 F. Supp. 2d 119,
123 (D. Mass. 2000) (“It is particularly difficult to try to distinguish between the packaging
and the product when discussing an ornamental bumper sticker. The packaging and the
product are so intertwined that distinguishing between them may be regarded as a scholastic
endeavor.”).
62 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213-14.
63 Id. at 214. The phrase derives from the premise that a medieval gambler’s expected
winnings must exceed the costs of a candle needed to provide light for the game. See
CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 230 (Catherine Soanes & Angus Stevenson eds.,
11th ed. 2008) (“(the game’s) not worth the candle: the potential advantages to be gained
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Scholars have explained other aspects of trademark doctrine as tradeoffs
between administrative and error costs as well. The famed Abercrombie64
spectrum protects “inherently distinctive” marks without any showing of
secondary meaning, but demands such proof when marks are “merely
descriptive.”65 Robert Bone suggests that a rough calculus about the low
probability of error for inherently distinctive marks (those labeled suggestive,
fanciful, or arbitrary), along with the significant administrative difficulty of
more careful evaluation, motivate the Abercrombie shortcut.66 Thomas Cotter
notes that an enforcement cost analysis can also explain why courts simply
presume that product design is functional, without seriously considering
whether any market harm results.67
In trademark fair use, current doctrine strikes these balances – both between
administrative and error costs and between different types of potential error –
poorly. As demonstrated in Part I, cases involving expressive uses now
involve very high administrative costs in the form of fact-intensive and lengthy
adjudication.68
As expected under decision theory, these high administrative costs keep
error costs of both kinds low at present. Reducing those administrative costs
might present a risk of increased error. But, as in criminal law, false positives
and false negatives would not be equally acceptable in trademark law. Current
doctrine guards most vigorously against the wrong type of error, Type II. The
high administrative costs in the current system arise from extreme doctrinal
dread of even minimal consumer confusion.69
False positives occur when a court incorrectly holds that a legitimate
expressive use infringed a trademark. Because courts rule against expressive
uses infrequently, there are now few false positives.70 If these Type I errors
became more common, however, they would impose very high costs. All the
odious results of speech limitations arise here: precluding competition, chilling
from doing something do not justify the cost or trouble involved”); THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 45 (Judith Siefring ed., 2d ed. 2004) (“The idea behind this idiom is
that expenditure on a candle to provide light for an activity would not be recouped by the
profits from that activity. The expression comes from the French phrase le jeu ne vaut pas la
chandelle, ‘the game is not worth the candle.’”).
64 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
65 Id. at 9.
66 Bone, supra note 47, at 2130 (“The rule that protects inherently distinctive marks on
first use in trade in effect conclusively presumes secondary meaning, and a conclusive
presumption is justified in these cases because it minimizes the sum of error and
administrative costs.”).
67 Cotter, supra note 59, at 556.
68 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; see also McGeveran, supra note 2, at
113-15 (“A desire to strike the ideal balance between confusion and speech in every case
has driven the administrative costs of trademark fair use very high.”).
69 See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 74-76.
70 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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artistic expression or commentary, and increasing markholders’ monopoly over
the public understanding of marks.71 Reasonable minds differ on the exact
whereabouts of the normative line beyond which restriction of speech becomes
unacceptable, but not on the more fundamental proposition that crossing this
line represents an especially undesirable false positive.72
As to false negatives, courts today integrate consideration of consumer
confusion directly into their analysis of trademark fair use in an effort to
prevent any and all potentially misleading uses of trademarks. I have argued at
length elsewhere that this “gravitational pull” toward prevention of confusion
distorts all the fair use doctrines in trademark law because courts drive up
administrative costs in order to eradicate any potential Type II error.73 For
example, the third and most important prong of the nominative use defense
requires that the defendant “do nothing that would . . . suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.”74 As applied in real-world litigation,
this element can demand exactly the sort of fact-laden inquiry that leads to
high administrative costs and lengthy adjudication, all motivated by the desire
to eliminate any potential for a false negative.75 Even under § 33(b)(4) of the

71

For discussion and examples of disputes where these values were at stake, see, for
example, Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 416-21; McGeveran, supra note 2, at 52-53;
Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 1040-51.
72 See CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme
Court has recognized the risks of overbroad injunctions, especially when First Amendment
considerations are at stake.” (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
765 (1994))); id. at 462 (“It is important that trademarks not be ‘transformed from rights
against unfair competition to rights to control language.’” (quoting Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1710-11
(1999))); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing independent normative
standard for judging false positives); infra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing void
for vagueness doctrine in free speech jurisprudence).
73 See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 112-13.
74 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
75 See, e.g., Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932, 93839 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (denying summary judgment on a nominative use argument because
questions of fact remained on third factor); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharon Woods
Collision Ctr., Inc., No. 1:07cv457, 2007 WL 4207158, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007)
(same); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 330
(D.N.J. 2006) (denying summary judgment on defendant’s counterclaim because fact issue
existed as to nominative use defense); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029–31 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment for defendants
in part because a nominative use argument failed on the first factor). See generally
McGeveran, supra note 2, at 95-97. Earlier this year Judge Kozinski, the originator of the
nominative use doctrine in New Kids, made an effort to simplify its administration in Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1180-82, (9th Cir. 2010), but a
concurring judge strongly objected that this very portion of Judge Kozinski’s majority
opinion inappropriately assumed facts. See id. at 1185-86 (Fernandez, J., concurring).
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Lanham Act,76 where a unanimous Supreme Court has explicitly held that
permissible uses might cause modest confusion in the marketplace77 – that is,
that trademark law has some tolerance for Type II error – some courts are
reluctant to relax their vigilance against false negatives.78 More generally, this
same imperative to stamp out all vestiges of any sort of confusion fueled the
overall expansion in the scope of trademark rights, and led Mark Lemley and
Mark McKenna to question whether some uses now found infringing cause any
material harm at all.79 They note that the actual damage from minimal
confusion rarely justifies the imposition of liability;80 based on the same
calculus I would argue that undue administrative costs to avoid false negatives
are, as in Wal-Mart, not worth the candle.
A better approach would reduce administrative costs, even if doing so might
allow some small quantity of consumer confusion in a few cases (that is, some
false negatives). It also would recognize that the social costs of false positives
are much more significant than the costs of false negatives. Trademark fair use
should incorporate these priorities in its balance. To be sure, we must not
overcorrect. A rule that allowed tenuous free speech claims to undermine
fundamental trademark protection, divert customers, or increase consumer
search costs needlessly would go much too far.81 The reform proposed in Part
III stops well short of such excesses. More commonly, most expressive uses –
and especially those in certain identifiable categories – are unlikely to cause
anything more than minimal harm to markholders’ legitimate interests in
maintaining consumer understanding about the source of goods and services.
The foregoing discussion gives theoretical heft to two fairly straightforward
intuitions. First, because the prospect of complex and cumbersome litigation
can deter desirable behavior and waste resources, adjudication should only be
76

15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123 (2004);
see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989) (making same point about
tolerating possible confusion when applying First Amendment considerations to the use of a
trademark in titles).
78 See, e.g., Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a fair use
defense because “[e]ven when we construe the facts in a light most favorable to D’Amato,
Audi has shown that there is a clear likelihood of confusion based on D’Amato’s use of the
Audi Trademarks”); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d
596, 607-09 (9th Cir. 2005) (on remand from the Supreme Court, expressing concern that
the challenged use might be confusing – in other words, that a finding of no liability might
be a false negative); see also Austin, supra note 10, at 186 (“[T]he danger of substantial
regulation of noncommercial speech is diminished by denying enforcement of a trademark
against uses of words that are not likely ‘to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to
deceive.’” (citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 564 (1987))).
79 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 422-26.
80 See id. at 429-32 (analyzing materiality of trademark harms).
81 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 1207-11.
77
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as costly as necessary to achieve acceptable levels of accuracy. Trademark fair
use doctrine in many cases can be simplified without increasing error unduly.
Second, doctrinal design should focus more intently on avoiding those
undesirable results that are more serious and more probable. False positives in
expressive use cases can impinge significantly on free speech; false negatives
in certain important categories cause only minimal harm, or are unlikely to
occur, or both. Especially within those categories where the chance of serious
Type II error is remote, trademark fair use should lean toward protecting open
communication.
B.

Articulation of Specific Simple Rules Rather Than Broad Standards

The second design choice helps bring the first to fruition. Where possible,
promulgation of relatively simple and unambiguous terms for trademark fair
use in advance will reduce those runaway administrative costs. Courts could
then dispose of cases at earlier stages such as the motion to dismiss or
summary judgment.82 Those reformed rules also can focus on protecting
against the more dangerous type of error, false positives. At least within
categories where false negatives are less likely, less serious, or both, simple
rules should displace the broad general standards that characterize almost all
trademark fair use determinations.
This aspect of the proposal draws on the extensive literature comparing
“rules” to “standards.” Of course, there is no clean binary split between rules
and standards. Rather, laws inhabit a spectrum between these two poles.83 In
addition, we need not reach a “one size fits all” decision between more rulelike or standard-like designs for all expressive uses. Law in a subject area
frequently combines rules and standards as appropriate.84 Trademark law is,
and should be, no different.85
There are two separate ways to understand the distinction between rules and
standards. Under one widely accepted account, rules already contain their
principal substance before the occurrence of whatever activity they regulate,
while adjudicators supply content to standards only after the fact.86 For

82

See Meurer, supra note 18, at 530-31.
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 45, at 258; Korobkin, supra note 45, at 26.
84 See also Popofsky, supra note 45, at 457-59 (discussing when rules are more
appropriate and when standards are more appropriate).
85 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP
Lecture: Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 144-52 &
n.202 (2009) (identifying the content of the prima facie case, balancing tests, and trumping
defenses as three distinct means of accommodating competing values in trademark law);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1657-60 (2007) (warning against development of a single
“wonder theory” to cure a wide range of problems in trademark law).
86 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
568-70 (1992); Eric Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
83
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example, a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour is a rule, while a
requirement that motorists maintain “reasonable speeds under the
circumstances” would be a standard.87
Most existing trademark fair use doctrines are standards under this
definition, because courts evaluate expressive uses ex post. Nominative use
doctrine, for instance, requires a court to determine whether the defendant used
“only so much of the mark . . . as is reasonably necessary to identify the
product or service.”88 The factors relevant to assessing the necessary amount
of use will differ from case to case, and a would-be user cannot evaluate them
Ad hoc First Amendment balancing requires similar
in advance.89
retrospective determinations by courts.90 More generally, all flavors of
trademark fair use analysis typically collapse into the baseline test of
likelihood of confusion.91 That ultimate liability standard in trademark law
certainly operates ex post – as an empirical examination of the way consumers
actually perceived the mark when the defendant used it.92 Even when courts
alter multifactor tests to fit certain factual patterns more neatly, they remain ex
post assessments.93 Overall, while various multifactor tests for trademark fair
POL’Y 101, 101-03 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953,
961-62 (1995).
87 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 45, at 257; Kaplow, supra note 86, at 560.
88 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992);
see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir.
2005).
89 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).
90 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924-38 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900-02 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]here an artistic work
targets the original and does not merely borrow another’s property to get attention, First
Amendment interests weigh more heavily in the balance.”); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v.
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993).
91 See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 112-13; McKenna, supra note 19, at 821-24
(describing the expansion of source confusion as a rationale throughout trademark law,
leading to the “fundamental inadequacy of modern trademark theory”).
92 See McKenna, supra note 19, at 815-16 (“[I]n the absence of direct evidence courts
have in the past engaged the question of source indication by focusing on circumstantial
evidence such as the nature and prominence of the use at issue . . . . [But] these
circumstantial clues are only proxies for consumer understanding.”).
93 Some circuits have developed pared-down versions of their multifactor tests in
response to recurring fact patterns. For example, the Ninth Circuit, which generally applies
the Sleekcraft factors to the issue of confusion, applies the “Internet Trinity” or “Internet
Trilogy” (a brew of three internet-specific factors) to initial interest confusion cases
involving the internet – although its evolution has been uneven. See Soilworks, LLC v.
Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (D. Ariz. 2008). Other types of
recurring fact patterns in trademark and unfair competition law also spawn similarly
targeted tests. See A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198,
229-34 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying a modified multifactor test to a “reverse confusion” factpattern); United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We
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use may provide somewhat more guidance ex ante than an even more openended standard such as “reasonableness,” they still make it difficult to
ascertain in advance whether a particular use of a mark will be found lawful.94
Over the years, as precedents accumulate, ex post standards can begin to
stabilize and start to resemble predictable ex ante rules.95 For example, courts
might consistently interpret a “reasonable speeds” standard to forbid driving
more than eighty miles an hour. During the long wait for enough case law to
develop, however, standards can make outcomes unpredictable.96 The small
number of litigated cases concerning expressive uses, and their widespread
distribution among various circuits applying multiple doctrines, means that the
standards in areas such as nominative use or First Amendment balancing
would not solidify into rules for a very long time.97 The torturous history of
nominative use doctrine, for example, does not encourage optimism that a
multifactor standard will evolve through precedent to more rule-like stability.98
Many lawyers use a second definition of the rules-standards dichotomy to
suggest, not quite a division between ex ante and ex post determinations, but
the notion that “rules” stipulate brighter lines while “standards” offer more
have recently distinguished between two types of comparative advertising claims brought
under the Lanham Act: (1) ‘my product is better than yours’ and (2) ‘tests prove that my
product is better than yours.’” (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion
Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 514 (8th Cir. 1996))). But cf. Libman Co. v. Vining Indus.,
Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1363 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (urging against mechanical
application of the multifactor test to recurring fact patterns: “[A] finding of likely confusion
can no more be based on pure conjecture or a fetching narrative alone than any other finding
on an issue on which the proponent bears the burden of proof.”). Continued expansion of
trademark law from classic source confusion toward variants such as initial interest
confusion, post-sale confusion, reverse confusion, and “bridging the gap” may explain the
proliferation of variant multifactor tests targeted at those specific fact patterns.
94 See Korobkin, supra note 45, at 28 (explaining that, while multifactor tests give
guidance to the adjudicator, such tests “still fall on the ‘standard’ side of the spectrum,
however, because they do not specify how adjudicators should weigh the relevant factors”).
95 Kaplow, supra note 86, at 611.
96 See Sunstein, supra note 86, at 973 (stating that when the Supreme Court issues
“ruleless decisions,” then “the absence of rules will force litigants and lower courts to guess,
possibly for a generation or more, about what will turn out to be the real content of the
law”).
97 See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
98 See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2010);
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005)
(establishing a “bifurcated approach” that places the initial burden on the plaintiff to prove
likely confusion and then shifts the burden to the defendant to show fair use); Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002); New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992); McGeveran, supra note 2, at 91-95
(describing chaotic and sometimes inconclusive development of doctrine to distinguish
nominative use from the § 33(b)(4) defense and from the prima facie case for likelihood of
confusion).
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general criteria.99 A legal command’s degree of complexity presents a design
choice distinct from the timing of the decisions that provide its content.100 An
ex ante legal command may be simple like a speed limit, but it also might
contain extreme detail, like some portions of the tax code.101 Similarly, a
“reasonable person” tort standard is simple enough to articulate in a few words
even though it must be applied ex post, while rococo multifactor tests are also
ex post determinations. Again, the degree of complexity falls along a
continuum, not into a neat split between two categories.102
Existing trademark fair use mechanisms also qualify as standards under this
“simple vs. complex” definition. Three multifactor tests often used to resolve
expressive use cases – the likelihood of confusion test, the § 33(b)(4) statutory
defense, and nominative use – cannot even be stated without resort to long lists
and verbal gymnastics. They demand complex and variable analysis. First
Amendment balancing sometimes presents more straightforward requirements,
particularly when courts lean heavily on speech-friendly presumptions.103
More often, however, courts considering First Amendment defenses in
trademark cases tend to rely on open-ended judgment calls about the strength
of a speech interest. Furthermore, many courts integrate fact-specific
considerations from the likelihood of confusion analysis into this balancing,
yielding an especially unwieldy and complicated standard.104

99

See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R.
Sunstein’s Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531, 541 (1997)
(book review); David Franklin, The Roberts Court, the 2008 Election & the Future of the
Judiciary, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 513, 515 (2008). Usually this may boil down to the
same distinction, or nearly so: typically, one expects that clear rules get their content ex ante
and broad standards get it ex post. Much of the literature in this area differentiates the
concepts, however, so I follow course here.
100 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 45, at 257-58; Louis Kaplow, General
Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON. 502, 502 (Bouckaert & De Geest
eds., 2000) (“The most commonly noted characteristic of rules concerns the degree of
precision, detail, or complexity they embody: how finely are different sorts of behavior to be
distinguished?”).
101 See Kaplow, supra note 86, at 588-90.
102 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 45, at 258.
103 See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 1074-75 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s “more than
zero percent relevant” test, which “implies . . . a presumption that a use is artistically
relevant”); Timbers & Huston, supra note 28, at 1287 (indicating that the Rogers test
“supplant[ed] the usual multi-factor likelihood of confusion analysis with a simpler . . . test”
that “does more than merely tip the balance in favor of the First Amendment”).
104 See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378-80 (2d
Cir. 1993); Lemme v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 433, 447-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). See
generally David M. Kelly & Lynn M. Jordan, Twenty Years of Rogers v. Grimaldi:
Balancing the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of Creators of Artistic Works,
99 TRADEMARK REP. 1360 (2009) (reviewing different circuits’ applications – and
adaptations – of the Rogers v. Grimaldi test).

2290

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90: 2267

A more rule-like design – in both the sense of ex ante substance and of
simply stated bright lines – would offer several advantages for trademark fair
use. First, specificity and predictability are especially critical where a vague
legal prohibition might discourage expression of ideas.105 Clear, simple rules
spelled out in advance tell those contemplating expressive uses of trademarks
where they stand, allowing them to adjust their speech if necessary to avoid
liability, and otherwise to proceed with confidence.106 This is one major
reason why courts so often strike down vague speech restrictions in criminal
law.107 A clear rule also increases the prospect that a plaintiff could face
various sanctions for pursuing a demonstrably weak claim.108
A preference for rules over standards would reduce compliance costs.109
This shift, in turn, can help correct for the asymmetric incentives of
markholders and would-be expressive users.110 Recipients of C&Ds about
expressive uses may capitulate less often if they can respond relatively cheaply
and easily by citing a simple and clear rule. Risk-averse intermediaries should
be more willing to permit an expressive use when they can rely on an
unambiguous legal argument in its favor.
Finally, law and economics scholarship finds that rules should be favored in
situations where a particular fact pattern arises frequently.111 Developing a
rule in advance for repeat fact patterns prevents the waste of adjudicators
reevaluating each situation anew.112 Conversely, standards may be more
efficient in unusual situations.113 As Part III demonstrates, certain categories
of expressive uses cause similar disputes over trademark rights on a regular
105

See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 45, at 263.
See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 111-12 (“[A]n attorney trying to draft a strong
response to a C&D would rather cite one clear rule instead of attaching a complex memo
filled with what-ifs.”).
107 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 773 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that
criminal statute’s “substantial imprecisions will chill speech, so the statute violates the First
Amendment”); Scull v. Virginia ex rel. Comm. on Law Reform & Racial Activities, 359
U.S. 344, 353 (1959) (“Certainty is all the more essential when vagueness might induce
individuals to forego their rights of speech, press, and association for fear of violating an
unclear law.”).
108 These sanctions could include penalties under Rule 11, FED. R. CIV. P. 11, or antiSLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) statutes such as that in California,
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1). See Ramsey, supra note 7, at 456 & n.438.
109 See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 1039; Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of
Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1909-11 (2007).
110 See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
111 See Kaplow, supra note 84, at 621 (“[W]hen behavior subject to the relevant law is
frequent, standards tend to be more costly and result in behavior that conforms less well to
underlying norms.”).
112 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 45, at 266; Kaplow, supra note 86, at 621; Posner,
supra note 86, at 112.
113 Kaplow, supra note 86, at 621; Posner, supra note 86, at 112.
106
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basis (both in courtrooms and in pre-litigation skirmishes over C&Ds), such as
uses within fictional works. This cost-benefit reasoning supports investment in
the development of simpler and more specific rules for those predictable
categories.
On the other hand, the most typical arguments in favor of standards are
comparatively weak in the context of many trademark fair use scenarios.
Standards allow adjudicators to consider individual facts and value judgments
in context. This flexibility is most valuable where false positives are especially
undesirable and where the nature of disputes is unpredictable. As already
noted, however, in many typical circumstances false positives cause minimal
harm in the form of slight consumer confusion.114 Moreover, as further
described in Part III, we can predict some defined categories that come up
repeatedly and present little risk of false positives.
In sum, whether judged by the timing of the determination or the degree of
specificity, existing trademark fair use doctrines usually constitute standards.
But the typical arguments for favoring standards over rules do not apply to
many situations involving expressive uses of trademarks.
C.

Separation From Prima Facie Elements

The theoretical argument thus far supports a recalibration of trademark law
to reduce administrative costs, tolerate some degree of Type II error in
expressive use cases, and develop clear rules for fair use. However, this
analysis of decisionmaking structure has not yet engaged with the particular
structure most relevant to a defendant in an expressive use case: the lawsuit.
When implementing the changes already discussed, courts also should
disentangle decisions about speech protection from those about prevention of
consumer confusion. Courts now process most trademark questions, either
formally or de facto, through analysis of consumer perception concerning the
nebulous concept of “source.”115 This assessment generally requires the
simultaneous evaluation of both the plaintiff’s rights and the defendant’s use.
Trademark law in general, and fair use cases in particular, need more robust
defensive doctrines that are distinct from this unwieldy balancing exercise. To
the extent possible, defendants should be able to raise trademark fair use as an
affirmative defense or as a completely independent argument for a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, rather than as a component of the
rebuttal to the plaintiff’s prima facie liability case.
In just a few situations, a defendant can avoid trademark liability without a
court considering both the validity of the mark and the nature of its use.
114 Supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text; see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
115 See McKenna, supra note 19, at 821-24 (“‘[S]ource’ in modern trademark law is an
extraordinarily broad concept capable of encompassing virtually any relationship between
entities.”).
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Traditional functionality considerations arise as part of the prima facie case,
insofar as the plaintiff must prove the absence of utilitarian functionality.116 If
the plaintiff fails to do so, the functional design receives no trade dress
protection, however much its use might confuse consumers.117 Even here,
evaluation of aesthetic functionality turns on a defendant’s competitive need
and as a result may require a court to consider the nature of the defendant’s use
as well as the plaintiff’s mark.118 Courts sometimes can reach determinations
about distinctiveness, including the inquiry into whether a mark is generic,
without examining the defendant’s use of the mark or consumer confusion
about it.119 These few exceptions prove the broader rule that trademark law
offers very few opportunities to adjudicate a case without delving into a
complex inquiry about consumer confusion.
The whole range of fair use doctrines exemplifies the dominant tendency to
merge defensive mechanisms with the prima facie confusion case. Some
courts and commentators rely on the likelihood of confusion test itself to
protect speech interests, apparently assuming that fair use must also be nonconfusing use.120 These arguments hinge on public perception of the
relationship between the defendant’s use and the plaintiff’s mark. The
defendant probably escapes liability if consumers perceive the use as a
designation of a completely independent producer,121 or as a part of
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006); Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150,
154 (6th Cir. 2003); Al-Site Corp. v VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“To prove trade dress infringement, the plaintiff must show . . . the essential
nonfunctionality of its trade dress.”).
117 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to
Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 728-38 (1999); McKenna, supra note 19, at 824 &
n.239 (explaining that functionality is “outcome determinative without regard to consumer
understanding”).
118 See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203-06 (11th
Cir. 2004) ; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support
of Appellant/Cross-Appellee New Life Art, Inc. and Daniel A. Moore and Affirmance in
Part at 16-24, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. New Life Art, Inc., Nos. 09-16412-AA, 1010092-A, (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2010) (discussing aesthetic functionality doctrine and
competitive necessity) (the author signed this amicus brief).
119 See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 100-01 (2d
Cir. 1989); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir.
1963); Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 1941); see also
Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. Organic Food Bar, Inc., No. SACV 06-0827 AG (RNBx), 2008
WL 1913163, at *5-8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008) (granting summary judgment on
genericness).
120 See, e.g., Chad J. Doellinger, Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the Demise of a
Doctrine, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 5, ¶ 9 (2003), available at http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v1/n1/5 (“[N]ominative fair use should be nothing more
than a term used to describe a peculiar fact pattern that, given the specific facts of the case,
does not lead to a likelihood of confusion.”); Leval, supra note 9, at 203.
121 See, e.g., Murray v. Cable Nat’l Broad. Co., 86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th. Cir. 1996).
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comparative advertising,122 or as a parody,123 to name a few examples. But
these avenues really just pose the empirical consumer perception question in
different ways. Even the special doctrines that supposedly aim to isolate and
immunize permissible uses – fair use under § 33(b)(4), nominative use,
“trademark use” theory, and special First Amendment defenses – instead
become entangled in the ultimate issues of trademark liability.124
At first glance, bundling the validity of protection and the impact of the
alleged infringement together in one evaluation might appear to favor
expressive uses by placing a greater burden of proof on the plaintiff.125
Formally speaking, of course, plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion to prove
likelihood of confusion.126 However, formal burdens usually matter only in the
hard cases close to equipoise, where they can serve as tiebreakers.127
Otherwise, a doctrinal structure that requires litigants and courts to wade into
issues of consumer perception imposes significant costs of both time and
money.128 Intertwined questions of fact often prevent a court from granting a
motion to dismiss or summary judgment until litigants have completed
discovery and briefing for the entire case.129 The actual burdens defendants
face when refuting the plaintiff’s evidence of confusion dwarf any benefit they
receive from the placement of a formal burden on the plaintiff.130

122 See, e.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 617-20 (7th Cir. 1995);
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968).
123 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252,
267-68 (4th Cir. 2007); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1989).
124 For a catalogue of the ways that each fair use doctrine collapses into the likelihood of
confusion inquiry, see McGeveran, supra note 2, at 77-109. See also supra note 73 and
accompanying text (discussing “gravitational pull” of confusion analysis and courts’
excessive caution about false negatives).
125 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117-18
(2004); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 221 (3d Cir.
2005).
126 See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[A]s the Supreme Court has unambiguously instructed, the Lanham Act always places the
‘burden of proving likelihood of confusion . . . on the party charging infringement.’”)
(quoting KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 118) ; Century 21, 425 F.3d at 222.
127 See William McGeveran, Comment, Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presumptions,
Defenses, and Burdens, 1 IP THEORY 26, 32 (2010), http://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/
index.php/ipt/article/view/882.
128 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003);
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1316-17 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
129 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447-59 (6th Cir. 2003); Health Grades,
Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242-43 (D. Colo.
2009); Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1317-35.
130 McGeveran, supra note 127, at 32-33 (“The plaintiff carries all the formal burdens to
demonstrate likelihood of confusion, but no sensible defendant sits idly on the sidelines
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More importantly, by combining the interests in avoiding confusion and
protecting expression together into one mega-inquiry, trademark law
submerges important normative choices. The costs of false positives and false
negatives blend together. Occasionally, in situations where some consumer
confusion exists, the impairment of free expression would be even worse.131
Current fair use doctrine conceals these situations. On the other hand, if a
court examines the statutory text and finds a clear separation between
confusion and fair use, as the Supreme Court did in its consideration of the
“statutory” or “classic” fair use defense under § 33(b)(4),132 this distinction
forces these submerged choices to the surface.133 Doctrinal structure thus
sends important signals about whether “some possibility of consumer
confusion must be compatible with fair use . . . .”134
In light of the problems with the combined confusion-and-use analysis, a
number of scholars have proposed mechanisms for separating them. In a
recent lecture, Graeme Dinwoodie made the case for more reliance on
independent defenses, which he defined as “rules permitting unauthorized uses
of marks even where such uses implicate the affirmative concerns of trademark
law . . . .”135 Supporters of a “trademark use” defense also seek screening tests
that avoid entanglement with the prima facie case.136 Others have criticized
the expansion of confusion rationales more generally and suggested responses
that would remove certain cases from their ambit.137
Although this separation would represent a departure for trademark law, it is
common in other areas of intellectual property. In patent law, many cases turn
on the existence of the plaintiff’s rights alone. Defendants frequently respond
hoping to win by the weakness of the plaintiff’s evidence. Defendants naturally must hire
their own experts, commission their own surveys, and brief their own interpretation of the
convoluted multifactor test.”).
131 See, e.g., Austin supra note 10, at 175; Lunney, supra note 14, at 481; McGeveran,
supra note 2, at 71-77.
132 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004).
The Court based this holding almost exclusively on its analysis of the Lanham Act’s text
and its observation that “Congress said nothing about likelihood of confusion in setting out
the elements of the fair use defense . . . .” Id.
133 Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 149 n.213.
134 KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 121 (analyzing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)).
135 Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 100; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis,
Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1711 (2007) (“[W]e do not
preclude the courts from developing common law defenses; indeed, our approach
encourages them to do so.”).
136 Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching
for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 1036-44, 1049-50 (2007); Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 5, at 805; Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark
Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 588-96 (2005); Widmaier, supra note 5, at 708-09.
137 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 443; McKenna, supra note 19, at 821-28; see
also Austin, supra note 10, at 182-88.
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to patent infringement claims by attacking the validity of the patent138 on
grounds such as inequitable conduct in the application process139 or the
existence of disqualifying prior art.140 These arguments disregard the nature of
a defendant’s activities entirely.141 As in patent, copyright defendants also
may challenge the existence of a plaintiff’s rights, regardless of the nature of
the defendant’s use, based on arguments such as insufficient originality.142
Conversely, copyright law also provides for categorical defenses that
immunize specified legitimate uses, from showing movie clips in classroom
teaching to making back-up copies of computer programs.143 These defenses
make little or no reference to whether, in the particular case, the protected use
implicates the purposes of extending copyright protection.144 Finally,
copyright defendants enjoy another option that combines evaluation of both the

138

See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (establishing presumption of validity and invalidity
defenses).
139 E.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
140 E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007) (patent invalid because
similar prior art made it obvious).
141 A patent defendant’s other option is the opposite: assuming validity but arguing that
the defendant’s use does not fall within the boundaries of the patent. See, e.g., Southwall
Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Contech
Stormwater Solutions v. Baysaver Techs., Inc., No. Civ.A. CCB-07-358, 2007 WL
2872074, at *12 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2007). Patent law offers almost no defenses for a use that
reads on a valid patent. But cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 82 (arguing in favor of “a
well-designed experimental-use exception from infringement liability”).
142 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991);
Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP. Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 60-62 (1st Cir. 2009),
vacating 535 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 2008); City of New York v. GeoData Plus, LLC,
537 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“GeoData claims that the City’s copyrights in
the Bytes Files are invalid because the Bytes Files lack sufficient originality.”); SHL
Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(“[D]efendants argue that plaintiff’s photographs are derivative works that must satisfy a
higher standard of substantial originality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2006) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the
following are not infringements of copyright: (1) performance or display of a work by
instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit
educational institution . . . .”); § 117(a)(2) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106,
it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided . . .
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival
copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should
cease to be rightful.”).
144 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112, 117-122 (2006) (defining scope of exclusive rights and
limitations on those rights); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 105-07 (comparing
structure of copyright law to trademark law).
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plaintiff’s rights and the defendant’s use: the fair use doctrine.145 Here, courts
simultaneously consider both the nature of the copyrighted work and the nature
of the unauthorized use, most notably in the crucial assessment of the effect on
the market for the copyrighted work.146 This feature partly explains why many
observers consider the copyright fair use doctrine such a mess.147 Yet such
combined analysis of plaintiff’s rights and defendant’s use pervades trademark
law.
The separation of validity from defenses – of the grant of protection from
the nature of the use – need not be realized purely through the formalism of
civil procedure labeling. In a loose way, proposals for independent doctrines
that confer immunity on potentially confusing expressive uses could be called
“defenses.” They might not act in all ways like traditional affirmative defenses
such as res judicata or the statute of limitations,148 but they are defensive
doctrines for two reasons. First, they focus on the defendant’s activities and
foreclose liability without inquiring into confusion.149 Second, they also
empower the defendant to seek early termination of a case, through
mechanisms such as a motion to dismiss or summary judgment, before the
court turns to complex and costly analysis of public perception.150
145

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include – (1) the purpose and
character of the use . . . ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”).
146 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236-38 (1990); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market
Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 38-53 (1997). Some courts also assess the “merger” doctrine of copyright law,
sometimes viewed as a “defense,” as part of its evaluation of validity. See, e.g., Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Assessing merger in the context of
alleged infringement will normally provide a more detailed and realistic basis for evaluating
the claim that protection of expression would inevitably accord protection to an idea.”). But
see Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
147 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 24, at 187 (“[F]air use in America simply means the right
to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright
Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2008) (“Fair use . . . remains fairly
unpredictable and uncertain in many settings . . . .”); Michael J. Madison, A PatternOriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1550-64 (2004) (cataloging
the “interpretive demons” in the statutory text of the fair use defense); David A. Simon,
Teaching Without Infringement: A New Model for Educational Fair Use, 20 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 453, 460-93 (2010) (discussing copyright fair use doctrine
as stifling teachers’ ability to use copyrighted material as teaching tools).
148 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1270 (3d ed. 2004).
149 See Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 100; McGeveran, supra note 127, at 30-31.
150 It is true that many systems, including the federal courts, distinguish between motions
to dismiss a complaint, which can be adjudicated before the defendant files an answer, and
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A couple of examples show how the formal labeling of defensive doctrines,
like the formal allocation of burdens,151 may make little difference in
expressive use cases.
The first example comes from defamation.
Traditionally, the common law placed no burden on a defamation plaintiff to
prove the falsity of the statement at issue and did not consider falsity an
element of the prima facie case.152 Over time, falsity effectively became an
element in a large majority of states, either standing alone or incorporated into
the requirement of “a false and defamatory statement.”153 In practice,
however, little changed. Today, courts still loosely refer to falsity as an
element and to truth as a defense, sometimes in the same paragraph.154 Either
way, a defendant may choose to raise arguments about the truthfulness of the
allegedly defamatory statement as a shield against liability as soon as the
available evidence has been gathered, possibly without judicial exploration of
any other issues. Similarly, the federal statute that immunizes websites and
other internet providers from liability for much user-generated content is
framed as an exclusion from liability, not as a formal affirmative defense.155
motions for adjudication on the pleadings, which encompass both the complaint and the
answer. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (requiring defendant to move to dismiss for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” before making responsive
pleading), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) (“After the pleadings are closed but early enough not to
delay trial a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”). Arguably, an affirmative
defense cannot be the basis for a motion until it is raised in the answer, so classification as
an affirmative defense may require defendants to wait slightly longer to raise the argument.
But see Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[W]e
now explicitly hold that an affirmative defense may be raised by pre-answer motion under
Rule 12(b) when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the
complaint.”). Either way, however, the court can act before discovery, so this really
represents a slight distinction – between early action and even earlier action.
151 See supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text (discussing burdens of persuasion).
152 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. b (1977).
153 Id. § 558 (stating elements of defamation cause of action).
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court hold that under the Constitution a
plaintiff must show fault on the part of the defendant regarding the truth or falsity of
the defamatory communication. Depending upon the circumstances, this fault may be
negligence or greater fault or must be knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity.
Meeting this requirement has, as a practical matter, made it necessary for the plaintiff
to allege and prove the falsity of the communication, and from a realistic standpoint,
has placed the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff.
Id. § 613 cmt. j (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
154 E.g., Cmty. Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King, 682 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ga. Ct. App.
2009) (“Because falsity is an essential element of both libel and slander, truth is a perfect
defense to a defamation action.” (quoting Lucas v. Cranshaw, 659 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Ladd v. Uecker, 780 N.W.2d 216, 219
(Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (listing “a false statement” as the first element of defamation but
stating later in the paragraph, “Truth is a complete defense”).
155 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
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Defendants are free to raise that immunity, based solely on the character of
their own operations, at various stages of litigation, including the initial motion
to dismiss156 and summary judgment.157
The design of such defensive doctrines in trademark law can draw on the
above review of decision theory and of rules and standards. By providing
immunity to certain categories of expression, a revamped fair use structure can
end cases before reaching the likelihood of confusion analysis – regardless of
whether it does so through a formal affirmative defense. Where that neat
separation is not practical, a second-best option would define situations where
a court should apply speech-protective presumptions. Both mechanisms are
fairly unusual for trademark law. Part III will demonstrate a model for these
changes.
III. THE PROPOSAL
Building on the design choices outlined in Part II, this Part presents a reform
proposal that focuses on administrative costs, favors rules over standards, and
functions independently from the prima facie liability case. A draft bill in an
Appendix at the end of the Article, dubbed the “Trademark Fair Use Reform
Act,” expresses this proposal in legislative terminology, as an amendment to
the Lanham Act.

information content provider.”); see Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1097, 1106-07
(9th Cir. 2009) (amending prior panel opinion to remove safe harbor from ambit of
affirmative defenses and allowing a defendant to move to dismiss the complaint when
protected by safe harbor); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735(RMB), 2009 WL
1704355, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (“[I]t is proper and appropriate to evaluate
Defendant’s Section 230 immunity defense in the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
because . . . the elements necessary to make a finding regarding Section 230 immunity are
apparent from the face of the Amended Complaint . . . .”); see also supra note 150
(explaining how affirmative defenses also may enable early dismissal).
156 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997); Goddard v. Google,
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 (E.D. Va. 2008); DiMeo v. Max, 433
F. Supp. 2d 523, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d 248 Fed. Appx. 280 (3d Cir. 2007).
157 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007); Prickett
v. infoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652-53 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Ben Ezra, Weinstein and
Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 97-485 LH/LFG, 1999 WL 727402, at *2-3 (D.N.M. Mar. 1,
1999), aff’d 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52
(D.D.C. 1998); see also 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 295
(D.N.J. 2006) (finding defendants ineligible for Section 230 safe harbor in part because they
were not an “interactive computer service” within the meaning of the statute); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065-68 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding defendants
ineligible for Section 230 safe harbor because they were content providers as well as an
interactive computer service, but granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
other grounds).
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Under the proposal, trademark cases that raise free speech issues would
move through a sequence of successively more complicated tests. One can
picture these tests as a series of nets inserted in a stream – the first and most
porous might catch only the largest fish, the second might have narrower holes
to capture smaller ones, and then the third would stop even tiny minnows.158
In combination, these nets should catch most false positives – that is, most
cases where protection of speech should trump the ordinary functions of
trademarks. Each test, however, imposes greater administrative costs to
adjudicate. Each one moves further along the spectrum from rules to
standards. Because this Article has identified administrative costs and
nebulous standards as key problems confronting trademark fair use, the bulk of
the proposal presented here concerns those earlier nets, with some comments at
the end directed to the later ones.
To mix aquatic metaphors for a moment, the first and simplest net is a
categorical exclusion, often called a safe harbor. Expressive uses that meet the
conditions of an exclusion are exempt from liability, without any further
inquiry into the likelihood of consumer confusion. Cases that fall outside these
defined categories would remain eligible for the existing trademark fair use
doctrines and presumably for standards-based reforms that other scholars have
suggested. Finally, courts would evaluate the remaining cases, those captured
by neither the exclusions nor existing or proposed defensive doctrines, under
the likelihood of confusion test. In these cases, the bill proposes a rebuttable
presumption against consumer confusion when challenged content is oriented
principally toward delivering messages beyond the identification of source.
A.

Why a Statute?

Before proceeding, it may be valuable to explain why I chose to embody
this proposal in statutory language and to present a draft. It may seem a rather
old-fashioned way to present ideas in a law review article.159 There are both
rhetorical and substantive advantages in doing so.
158 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 805 (“The trademark use requirement serves a
gatekeeper function, limiting the reach of trademark law without regard to a factual inquiry
into consumer confusion.”); Widmaier, supra note 5, at 621-24.
159 See, e.g., George Bronz, Conversion of Foreign Currency in Customs Administration,
34 TEX. L. REV. 78, 96-102 (1955); Eli Goldston & James H. Scheuer, Zoning of Planned
Residential Developments, 73 HARV. L. REV. 241, 253-62, 266-67 (1959); John C. Jacobs,
Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1224-28 (1948); Frank C.
Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable? – Proposals as to Estoppel and Related
Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1953). For more recent examples
motivated by some of the same considerations noted in the text, see Timothy K. Armstrong,
Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of
the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 364-65, 419-20 (2010); Cara H. Drinan, The
National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense
Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 489, 497-99 (2010); Raymond M. Saunders & Patrick
Butler, A Timely Reform: Impose Timeliness Rules for Filing Bid Protests at the Court of
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Rhetorically, crafting the actual language of proposed legislation forces
choices that are necessary for designing effective categorical exemptions. I
wanted to avoid the academic temptation to assume that the necessary clarity
and specificity could be achieved, somehow or other. Conversely, a predictable
objection to the very idea of a clear safe harbor rests on doubt that the task is
possible. I hope that plotting out the categories with more detail demonstrates
to proponents and skeptics alike that it can be done. In addition, leaving safe
harbors only vaguely defined might invite critics to quibble about their precise
content, rather than concentrate on my larger point that per se rules would
reduce the chilling effect. Arguments about the precise textual details are
inevitable and important discussions about any legislative enactment.160
However, they jump ahead of the more general main point of this Article.
Substantively, there are some reasons to believe that a legislative enactment
would be a better mechanism for reform than judge-made common law
evolution. First of all, at least some entrenched judicial reluctance, and
perhaps textual obstacles, impede courts from engaging in creative
interpretations of the Lanham Act.161 Furthermore, because disputes of this
type settle very frequently, courts have limited opportunities to see enough
cases to refine the tests. Trademark cases also arise in many different federal
courts, each operating within their own particular precedent.162 This
fragmentation of trademark law prevents uniformity and reduces certainty,
exactly the attributes needed to reduce the chilling effect.163 As each court
Federal Claims, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 539, 570, 580-81 (2010).
160 Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1511 (2007) (“As is the case with any legal rule, one may take issue with the specific
limitations we suggest.”).
161 See generally Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse than We Think: Trademark
Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897 (2009).
162 A PACER search for cases filed under the numerical identifier associated with
trademark cases (840) filed between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009 yields a broad
distribution across all states. California had the highest count (755), followed by New York
(387), Florida (255), and Texas (244). Most states had between twenty and eighty cases.
Results of PACER Search, run on June 18, 2010 (on file with author). Numbers available
from the Federal Judicial Center support this general distribution of intellectual property
cases. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. District Courts – Civil Cases
Commenced, by Nature of Suit and District, During the 12 Month Period Ending March 31,
2008 (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/
2008/tables/C03Mar08.pdf; Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. Courts of Appeals –
Nature of Suit or Offense in Cases Arising From the U.S. District Courts, by Circuit, During
the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2008 (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2008/tables/B07Mar08.pdf.
163 See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 749 (2004)
(“‘Predictably, the diverging viewpoints in this area have produced a muddled body of case
law, characterized by such inconsistency among and within the circuits that it has become
difficult to predict how a court will deal with a particular case.’” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the

2010]

TRADEMARK FAIR USE REFORM ACT

2301

pursued its own version of fair use reform, that uniformity problem would
grow worse. Finally, when courts have developed trademark tests in the past,
the results have been the opposite of sharp-edged clarity. The multifactor
confusion test is notoriously opaque,164 and the cacophony of courts applying
different versions of nominative use or First Amendment balancing got us into
this mess in the first place.165 For these rhetorical and substantive reasons, I
include a draft bill in the Appendix, which would amend the Lanham Act to
add the reforms I propose.
Political reality, of course, may well make it impossible to pass such a law
in Congress. The same asymmetric incentives that influence behavior in
trademark disputes166 would operate, in the legislative process through public
choice theory, as they already have in both copyright law167 and trademark
law.168 Broad but diffuse support for free speech might not overcome
concentrated opposition from highly motivated markholders. Overburdened
legislators understandably may not see the issue as a priority.
Even if a statute might be the ideal, courts also can and should adopt the
types of per se mechanisms discussed in this Article when adjudicating
trademark cases. Advocates for reform of intellectual property law already
turn to the judiciary to seek, through impact litigation and amicus practice, the
implementation of their policy preferences.169 Some scholars debate how
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006). For a recent
examination of one particular circuit’s trademark jurisprudence and its difference from other
circuits, see Kenneth L. Port, Eighth Circuit Trademark Opinions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1657 (2010).
164 See Austin, supra note 10, at 169; Beebe, supra note 163, at 1583-84.
165 Compare Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175-76 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“In cases where a nominative fair use defense is raised, we ask whether (1) the
product was ‘readily identifiable’ without use of the mark; (2) defendant used more of the
mark than necessary; or (3) defendant falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed by
the trademark holder.” (quoting Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.2d 796, 801 (9th
Cir. 2002))), with Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 221 (3d
Cir. 2005) (declining to follow Ninth Circuit’s nominative use test but devising a “modified
likelihood of confusion test to be employed in nominative fair uses cases that takes into
account the concerns expressed by” the Ninth Circuit). Regarding the First Amendment
tests, see Kelly & Jordan, supra note 104, at 1374-83 (cataloguing circuits’ differing
applications of Rogers v. Grimaldi to First Amendment balancing).
166 See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
167 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-63 (2001).
168 See, e.g., Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act – A Consumer
Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189 (2006) (describing
lobbying and negotiation over the recent revision of the Lanham Act’s trademark dilution
provisions).
169 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 n.* (2003) (listing the fourteen
amicus briefs filed in support of petitioner’s challenge to Congress’s extension of the term
of existing copyrights in the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998; petitioners were
represented by noted law professor Lawrence Lessig); Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review
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much leeway the Lanham Act gives courts to create new trademark
defenses.170 However, the broadly worded likelihood of confusion standard
itself delegates substantial authority to courts to determine the best means of
judging consumer understanding, which could include per se determinations.171
The statute does not even specify how much confusion should engender
liability, forcing courts to determine this quantum themselves and ascertain
when slight confusion might be acceptable.172 Indeed, the Abercrombie
and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 36 (2003);
About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/about (last visited
Sept. 11, 2010) (“EFF fights for freedom primarily in the courts, bringing and defending
lawsuits even when that means taking on the US government or large corporations.”);
Positions in Amicus Curiae Briefs, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCATION,
http://www.aipla.org/Content/NavigationMenu/IP_Issues_and_Advocacy/Amicus_Briefs/A
micus_Briefs_TOC.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) (listing more than 70 cases in which the
American Intellectual Property Law Association filed amicus briefs); Cyberlaw Clinic,
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/teaching/clinical# (last updated Aug. 31, 2010) (“The Cyberlaw
Clinic provides high-quality, pro-bono legal services to appropriate individuals, small startups, non-profit groups and government entities regarding cutting-edge issues of the Internet,
new technology and intellectual property.”); Fair Use Project, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET
AND SOCIETY, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/taxonomy/term/374
(last visited Sept. 11, 2010) (“The Stanford Center for Internet and Society’s ‘Fair Use
Project’ . . . was founded in 2006 to provide legal support to a range of projects designed to
clarify, and extend, the boundaries of ‘fair use’ in order to enhance creative freedom.”);
Amicus Briefs, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, http://www.inta.org/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=125&Itemid=151&getcontent=3 (last visited
Sept. 11, 2010) (“[International Trademark Association] gives its expertise in trademark law
to national courts around the world through amicus briefs or other related filings.”).
170 Compare Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 137-139, 143 & n.182 (arguing that courts
interpreting Lanham Act are often influenced by “a number of . . . prudential
considerations” other than text and “remain willing” to refer back to common law
principles), and Leval, supra note 9, at 198 (classifying the Lanham Act as a “delegating
statute” and arguing that textual approach to interpretation of such statute is “wholly
inappropriate”), with Grynberg, supra note 161, at 945-56 (“Barring further congressional
action, section 33(b)[s list of defenses] seems a closed set, which looms as a problem for
any defense innovations that cannot fit within its provisions.”).
171 See Grynberg, supra note 161, at 966-67. Grynberg suggests that the capacity to
derive safe harbors from the likelihood of confusion standard may be limited to the
establishment of rebuttable presumptions rather than outright categorical exclusions. Id.
While he may be right about judges’ reluctance to develop robust per se rules, nothing in the
statute or doctrine strips them of the authority to do so. Courts are free to change their
multifactor tests radically, presumably including the elimination of entire factors – so they
already have adopted rules that recognize some indicia of confusion and disregard others.
Grynberg also points out that courts’ free reign to judge confusion allows them just as easily
to find confusion in more cases rather than fewer (as indeed is the general trend), id at 913,
but this goes to the possible impermanence of a safe harbor, not the authority to create it.
172 See, e.g., George & Co., v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 398 (4th Cir.
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spectrum of distinctiveness173 and the multifactor likelihood of confusion
test174 both came into being as common law creations of courts applying the
general liability standards in the Lanham Act. Absent congressional action,
courts could use additional and different heuristics to judge likelihood of
confusion, just as the draft bill suggests.175 (And, of course, even if legislation
of this type came into being, courts would need to interpret and apply its
terms.)
Whether they are legislators, judges, or scholars, readers of this Article
should take the draft legislative language as it is intended. The proposed bill
represents a starting point, embodying an overall approach to the reform of
trademark fair use. Some might argue against one or more of the illustrative
categorical exclusions, while others might propose additional ones. Some
might object that certain important expressive uses of trademarks, such as
many typical parodies, do not fall within the categories. If the ensuing
argument centers on the content and formulation of safe harbors rather than the
wisdom of the overall approach, then I will consider this Article to have done
its job.
B.

Categorical Exceptions

Section 2 of the draft bill amends existing exclusions now in the Lanham
Act for trademark dilution claims. Section 3 adds a proposed new section to
the Lanham Act which contains new categorical exemptions from both
trademark dilution and trademark infringement liability (section 46(a)). When
applying the rules in both sections, a court simply determines whether a party’s
actions satisfy the conditions for the exclusion; if so, the party is not liable.
Many other areas of the law include similar per se rules. Examples range from
disclaimers of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code176 to the statute
shielding online intermediaries from tort liability for user-generated content.177
2009); John Allan Co. v. Craig Allen Co. , 540 F.3d 1133, 1140 (10th Cir. 2008); Universal
Money Ctrs., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1994).
173 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
174 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 9, §§ 24:30-43 (describing the multifactor tests in all circuit courts,
and collecting cases).
175 For that matter, groups working to develop grass roots “best practices” for fair use in
the copyright realm might consider extending their efforts to trademark fair use, perhaps
pushing legal decisionmakers toward adoption of similar reforms. See Peter Jaszi,
Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 715, 732-36 (2007)
(describing efforts to develop statements of “best practices” for copyright fair use within
particular professional or artistic communities); Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use
and Best Practices: Surprising Success, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 26.
176 See U.C.C § 2-316(2) (2005) (prescribing specific contractual language to disclaim
implied warranties of fitness).
177 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
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The analysis of design choices in Part II guides the selection and drafting of
these safe harbors. If chosen judiciously, the protected categories should be
those where the social cost of curtailing valuable expression outweighs the
utility of a complex inquiry into the impact on the economic functions of
trademarks. Such exemptions should reduce administrative costs that fuel the
prelitigation chilling effect. At the same time, while there will be cases within
the safe harbors where some residual consumer confusion exists, the areas
protected should be those where confusion is less likely and where the harm
caused by any such false negatives will be relatively low. Finally, although not
framed as affirmative defenses, these categorical exclusions would function as
defensive doctrines separate from the prima facie case, allowing defendants to
raise them before consideration of the likelihood of confusion and to seek early
termination of the case.
To achieve these goals, the structural design of safe harbors must avoid
complex threshold tests to determine whether the exemption applies, and
particularly fact-specific analysis similar to the likelihood of confusion test.
Thus it is imperative to remember that this is merely the first line of defense,
and the least nuanced. Omitting a particular use from the protected category
does not automatically result in liability, but merely moves the inquiry on to
the next stage where more detailed analysis will be possible.
The proposal here includes five safe harbors. The first would apply only to
trademark dilution. The other four safe harbors, which also encompass
trademark infringement, would provide immunity for uses within
communicative works, for titles, for news reporting and news commentary, and
for certain forms of political speech. All five proposed safe harbors would
protect uses of trademarks in regularly occurring fact patterns where a clear
rule is more important than perfectly calibrated prevention of all consumer
confusion. As noted above, there may be ways to refine these definitions
further so that they provide the optimal balance between administrative and
error costs, or offer even greater clarity. Similarly, there may be other
categories in trademark law where a similar safe harbor approach might be
worth considering.178 Once the architecture was in place, adding these other
types of exclusions would prove relatively easy. Whatever their precise
details, the examples here should provide the template for the types of
categorical exclusions that would improve trademark fair use.

information content provider.”); supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
178 For example, some might propose an exemption for indexing, such as that done by
online search engines and other aggregation web sites. I share the reservations of a number
of critics who caution that such a move might be premature at the moment. See Eric
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 521-25
(2005); Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1396-1398 (2008).
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A Dilution Safe Harbor

Congress has already created one safe harbor that purports to shield certain
speech-related uses from federal trademark liability, but only in the context of
dilution claims, not infringement.179 Dilution applies when a use of a mark
“lessen[s] the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services” even if the defendant’s use might not cause confusion among
consumers as required for traditional infringement claims.180 The defendant’s
use can give rise to dilution liability if it either “tarnishes” the reputation of the
mark or “blurs” its distinctiveness.181 When Congress first established a
federal dilution claim in 1995, the statute included a safe harbor from dilution
liability;182 Congress amended it significantly in 2006.183 As I have argued

179

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).
Exclusions. – The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution
by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of
such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of
source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with –
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or
services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous
mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.
Id.
180 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, §§ 3-4, 109 Stat. 985,
985-986 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000)); see Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429-31 (2003). For more analysis on dilution law, see Barton
Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of
Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 449 (2008) (quantitative study of dilution case law, concluding that the revised statute is
ineffective); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033 (2006) (empirical
study of how the federal antidilution statute has been applied and enforced, showing that
“enforcement of dilution claims has been dropping over time”); Sara Stadler Nelson, The
Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003) (examining history of
dilution law and proposing a “ubiquity” defense where a markholder dilutes its own mark by
using it too broadly).
181 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)-(C).
182 Federal Trademark Dilution Act § 3(4) (“The following shall not be actionable under
this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the
famous mark. (B) Noncommercial use of a mark. (C) All forms of news reporting and news
commentary.”).
183 See supra note 179 (citing and quoting exclusions in force since 2006 amendments).
See generally Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Rolls Out a
Luxury Claim and a Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 205 (2007); Levy, supra note
168.
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elsewhere, however, this safe harbor, especially in its amended form, fails to
provide the necessary clarity.184 Like many other trademark fair use defenses,
it imports complicated and fact-laden inquiries about consumer perception that
lie at the heart of other trademark cases.
The first safe harbor in the draft bill would radically simplify the existing
dilution safe harbor.185 Under the proposal, as long as the use of the mark
“supports communication of information, ideas, or expression beyond merely
proposing a commercial transaction,” it would be exempt from dilution
liability.186 So, for example, claims alleging trademark dilution arising from
the use of a mark in a song,187 a movie title,188 or commentary on a web site189
would be subject to quick dismissal based on the categorical exclusion. In
addition, the draft bill retains the existing categorical exclusion for
comparative advertising.
The scope of the new proposed exclusion borrows from the definition of
commercial speech under First Amendment doctrine.190 The definition thus
offers a convenient and tested mechanism to identify speech that is particularly
important to defend from excessive regulation. Courts are familiar with this
boundary after decades of work drawing it in constitutional cases. While
constitutional doctrine of its own force may not necessarily require this
distinction within trademark law, the same normative values behind the First
Amendment animate concerns about overbroad trademark rights against
expressive uses.191 Judge Alex Kozinski originally applied this exact
interpretation to the earlier version of the dilution safe harbor192 and a number

184 See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 104-09; see also Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, Tool of
the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Problems with the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1945-54 (2007).
185 See infra Appendix, § 2 (section of the draft bill, amending § 43(c)(3) of the Lanham
Act to replace existing exclusion from dilution liability with new language).
186 See id.
187 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002).
188 See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733
(D. Minn. 1998).
189 See, e.g., BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445, at *6
(D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007).
190 See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-62 (1976); MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Barrett, supra note 136, at 987-91
(applying constitutional commercial speech concepts to scope of trademark claims).
191 See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 427-31(2008) (“First
Amendment values are broader than doctrine; they are the goals and policies which animate
it, and represent our aspirations for the kind of free society we want to live in. The answer to
the problem lies in building First Amendment values . . . into other legal and social
structures.”).
192 MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 905-07.
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of later cases followed his lead.193 The amendment of the statute in 2006 may
have undermined Judge Kozinski’s reading of the text, however,194 even
though all evidence indicates that Congress would have done so
unintentionally.195 This proposed safe harbor would simply codify Judge
Kozinski’s original rule. These broad exemptions make sense because, unlike
traditional trademark infringement law, which protects the public and the
market as well as the plaintiff, only the plaintiff receives the core benefits of
dilution liability.196 A dilution plaintiff need not prove that the complained-of
use ever confused consumers about the origins of products. As a result, the
error cost of a false negative is extremely low and does not include any harm to
the general consuming public. When noncommercial uses of a mark or
comparative advertising do cause such damaging confusion, the markholder
may still bring an infringement claim. Those claims need more narrowly
constructed safe harbors in order to protect consumers, ensure competition, and
strike a balance between speech interests and the economic functions of
trademarks.197
2.

Communicative Works

Moving from the narrower field of dilution to encompass all trademark
claims, including infringement, the bill would create four categorical
exemptions.198 The first of these would immunize the use of a trademark

193

See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003);
Roxbury Entm’t v. Penthouse Media Grp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 n.8 (C.D. Cal.
2009); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339-40 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Burnett
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Am.
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695-97 (N.D. Ohio 2002); cf. Universal
Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing MCA Records
in interpreting First Amendment limitations on state dilution law).
194 See McGeveran, supra note 2, at 107-09.
195 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H6965 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Smith)
(stating that amended exemptions would “more clearly protect traditional first amendment
uses”); Gerhardt, supra note 183, at 221 (2007) (stating that amended bill “may be viewed
as fuel for consumer and competitive discourse because it articulated relatively broad fair
use provisions”); William Joern, Legislative Update, Goodwill Harboring: The Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 Legitimates the Goodwill Investment in a Trademark While
Safeguarding the First Amendment, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 267, 291
(2007) (“The defenses to a claim of dilution have been substantially buttressed . . . .”).
196 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 904-05 (explaining why dilution poses a greater threat
to First Amendment values than does traditional infringement); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in
Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 554-55
(2008) (demonstrating flaws in arguments that consumers or markets benefit from dilution
liability).
197 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 1207-11.
198 See infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing new section of the Lanham Act, labeled § 46, and
including four exemptions under § 46(a)).
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within “communicative works.”199 These sorts of uses of trademarks give rise
to a surprising number of disputes.200 They also have been a particular focus
of scholarly attention.201
The bill provides a definition of such a work, again based on the commercial
speech doctrine: A communicative work “has as its primary purpose the
communication of information, ideas, or expression, beyond proposing a

199 Id. The language exempts:
Use of a mark within the body of a work when the work has as its primary purpose the
communication of information, ideas, or expression, beyond proposing a commercial
transaction. Examples of such communicative works include, but are not limited to:
books, films, newspapers, magazines, online web sites, musical compositions, and
video games . . . .
Id.
200 See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1101
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the video game Grand Theft Auto was protected by the First
Amendment when it borrowed elements of real locations to represent a fictional version of
Los Angeles); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806-12 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that use of BARBIE name and trade dress in parodic Food Chain Barbie
photographs was not infringing or diluting); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d
894, 900-02 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Barbie Girl song mocking BARBIE doll was
noninfringing); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 124243 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (examining fine art depicting University of Alabama football players in
trademark crimson and gray uniforms); Volkswagen AG v. Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc.,
614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798-99 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (considering a children’s book with pictures
of, and in the shape of, Volkswagen Beetle cars); BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, C.A. No. 6:06109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445, at *5-7 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007) (rejecting trademark claims
against criticism of company by blogger); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp.
2d 913, 915-16 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (examining the appearance of CATERPILLAR bulldozers
driven by anti-environmental bad guys in the movie George of the Jungle 2); Wham-O, Inc.
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257-58 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting
trademark claim arising from foolish use of SLIP ‘N SLIDE YELLOW by character in a
movie, causing allegedly comedic injury); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 330, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that imitation of famous CHARLES ATLAS
advertisement involving bully kicking sand at beach as part of comic-book story was not
infringement); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp.
1546, 1551-52 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (considering a suit by makers of STARBRITE vehicle
polishes over a TV movie where villainous corporate polluters manufactured “Starbrite
Batteries”); Emily Umbright, St. Louis-Based Appliance Maker Emerson Sues NBC, ST.
LOUIS DAILY REC., Oct. 6, 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4185/is_20061006/
ai_n16773876 (describing trademark lawsuit by maker of IN-SINK-ERATOR garbage
disposal over use of product in NBC TV series Heroes).
201 See, e.g., AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 3 (exploring the high costs of rights
clearances on documentary filmmakers); Gulasekaram, supra note 7 (arguing that trademark
owners should not prevail against artists using the marks in works protected by the First
Amendment); Rosenblatt, supra note 7 (examining how flaws in trademark law may chill
speech and entertainment).
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commercial transaction.”202 It also provides illustrative examples of works that
qualify, stating that they “include, but are not limited to: books, films,
newspapers, magazines, web sites, musical compositions, and video games . . .
.”203 The exclusion would apply only to uses within the body of the work; the
bill provides separate (and somewhat more limited) protection to uses in titles
or in promotion of communicative works.204
Because of the speech values inherent in the contents of communicative
works, a chilling effect is especially worrisome, making the danger of false
positives especially strong. At the same time, there generally will be a low
potential for seriously harmful consumer confusion from uses of trademarks
within content that aims primarily to express ideas. Whatever confusion does
occur would have limited direct materiality to purchasing decisions because it
would largely concern confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship rather than to
the identity of the source.205
A court considering this categorical exemption would occupy itself first, not
with the question of whether a defendant’s use of a mark caused confusion, but
whether the use was contained within a work that qualifies for this safe harbor.
To be sure, as with any rule, there would be “hard cases” when applying this
definition. For example, is the art on a t-shirt a communicative work by this
definition? Messages on clothing sometimes represent constitutionally
significant speech.206 Where a shirt merely reproduces a mark such as a sports
logo or the NIKE “swoosh,” it is not engaging in additional communication
beyond source identification and therefore it probably falls outside the exempt
category.207 Merchandising rights in this context have been hotly debated, and
there may be other sound reasons to limit or abolish those rights,208 but a t-shirt
merely reproducing a logo does not seem to fit within the frame of
“communicative works” established here.
Nevertheless, the proposed
definition also leaves a court space to find a particular t-shirt that engages in
202

Infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing a new section of the Lanham Act, labeled § 46).
Id.
204 Id.
205 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 434-38; see also infra notes 215-217 and
accompanying text.
206 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
207 See e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808-11 (Cal.
2001) (struggling with the issue in a right of publicity case).
208 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 478-95 (2005) (critiquing the legal and
theoretical foundations of merchandising rights); Michael Einhom, Publicity Rights,
Merchandising and Economic Reasoning, ENTM’T & SPORTS LAWYER, Fall 2005, at 27-28;
Sheldon W. Halpern, Trafficking in Trademarks: Setting Boundaries for the Uneasy
Relationship Between “Property Rights” and Trademark and Publicity Rights, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1013, 1023-25 (2009); Newman, supra note 20, at 379-80 (arguing that people
wearing or using legitimate, branded merchandise should be free to appear in any real-world
context, even a commercial one, as they wish).
203
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substantial alteration of the mark might qualify for the exemption, especially if
it does so to make a critical point about the markholder.209
The reality that a few borderline cases will always test the limits of any rule
does not justify doing without the rule at all.
Most cases would
straightforwardly fall on one side of the line or the other: a television program
qualifies, but the advertisements interspersed in the show do not. Just as
importantly, the issue at the forefront of the analysis would be the speech value
of the use, not whether there was any potential for even minimal consumer
confusion. This approach puts the spotlight on the normative importance of
free speech rather than submerging it in the likelihood of confusion analysis as
so often occurs.210
The categorical exemption still works better than existing defenses that
might be available to the defendant who used a mark in settings such as a
magazine article or documentary film. First, as noted above, it is fear of
litigation, not ultimate liability, that causes most of the chilling effect.211 The
prospect of defending against a suit, even if one ultimately prevails,
discourages unlicensed use of trademarks in communicative works. The
clarity and lower administrative costs offered by a safe harbor in most cases
will reassure artists, commentators, critics – and the intermediaries involved in
bringing their work to the public – that the law protects their fair use of marks
within communicative works.
Second, consumer perception in this area is malleable. The public is aware
of “product placement” deals where markholders arrange for their products to
be featured in communicative products such as movies. Several scholars have
warned that the growing practice threatens to alter consumer understanding of
the legal requirement and fuel a growing impression that markholders have the
power to prevent these uses.212 This view, in turn, would increase the
likelihood that consumers would find unauthorized depictions confusing – and
over time that consumer belief would turn into the law because those
perceptions would convert previously safe uses into unlawfully confusing
ones. A categorical exemption would break this vicious cycle once and for all
by disconnecting the legal result from consumer perception.
Third, some creators themselves believe (often incorrectly) that such uses
are always legally forbidden. As one documentary filmmaker put it:
[Trademarks are] everywhere. I cut a scene from a film because there
was a big cup with this gas station trademark on it, but the problem is,
you can’t go into a store, you can’t buy anything that doesn’t have a logo
on it. So they don’t give you the option of having a cup with no logo, but
209

See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987);
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339-40 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
210 See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
212 See Gibson, supra note 3, at 907-08; Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 940; Rosenblatt,
supra note 7, at 1033.
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I was like, ‘oh god, I didn’t realize that cup had this huge logo in the side
of the frame.’213
This filmmaker’s understanding of trademark law is almost certainly
incorrect. But in the end it may not matter. Her understandable aversion to
risking litigation that could threaten the entire project over a single incidental
logo caused her to remove “a very heavy scene” about addiction from her
film.214 Efforts to educate artists and other speakers about the complexities of
fair use would be much easier if they could be expressed in a crisp sentence
rather than a lengthy and equivocal pamphlet.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the nature of any resulting
consumer confusion further reduces the significance of false negatives. This is
not passing off, the most traditional form of trademark injury, where
consumers believe that the infringer sells the markholder’s product. For
example, a few years ago Caterpillar Inc. sued over the depiction of its
products in the straight-to-video children’s movie George of the Jungle 2,
because anti-environmental villains drove CATERPILLAR bulldozers in their
efforts to destroy the hero’s home.215 The movie audience received no
misimpressions that were material to their immediate purchasing decisions; at
most, viewers might assume, erroneously, some association between the
filmmakers and Caterpillar.216 But as Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna
recently argued with support from empirical marketing literature, “any harm to
producers from confusion about sponsorship or affiliation is quite attenuated:
producers suffer no lost sales, and they are unlikely to suffer any reputational
consequences absent additional information suggesting control over the
partner.”217 Even if there is some reduction in a markholder’s control over the
mark, this is far removed from the core purposes of trademark law.218 Any
error cost here is extremely weak.
Besides the confusion test, other aspects of existing law may shield
communicative works from trademark liability. Doctrines such as nominative
use or First Amendment defenses, however, exemplify the flaws of existing

213

Heins & Beckles, supra note 3, at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
215 Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916-17 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
Fortunately, “[g]eorge and his allies manage to decommission these bulldozers in several
different ways, generally involving instances of combustible ape flatulence and projectile
coconuts and animal feces.” Id. at 917.
216 Id. at 918 (“As the Court understands Caterpillar’s argument, Caterpillar is
contending that the appearance of its products and trademarks is likely to confuse
consumers into believing that George 2 is somehow sponsored by, associated with, or
otherwise affiliated with Caterpillar.”).
217 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 436-37.
218 There might be some injury here closer to the “tarnishment” branch of trademark
dilution, but as already discussed, this error cost is so weak that a blanket exemption from
dilution liability is justified. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
214
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trademark fair use provisions. As the first line of defense they are too vague,
inconsistent, and fact-intensive. They require high administrative costs and
express themselves as open standards rather than definitive rules. As noted
below, these more context-sensitive doctrines can play a role in the less easy
cases. But for cases that fall within the parameters of the safe harbor, a brightline exemption is superior.
3.

Titles of Communicative Works

The draft bill would extend an additional categorical exclusion to titles of
communicative works.219 This safe harbor would be narrower than the
previous two because of the more complex issues in play.
Titles contain important speech.220 Copyright law generally does not protect
single titles,221 while trademark law limits protection to situations where a
markholder proves secondary meaning, which can be a stringent
requirement.222 These limits make it relatively easy for an author to refer back
to the title of a previous book or film in a new title. That author does not
necessarily have the same freedom if the title alludes to another mark
instead.223 Given the complexity required for a full analysis of likelihood of
confusion and the significant speech interests at stake, titles are appropriate for
a safe harbor.
Nevertheless, titles of communicative works raise more issues than do their
contents because consumers more plausibly might view titles as indicators of
source, and such indicators could be material to purchasing choices.224 A
219

See infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing new § 46(a)(2) of the Lanham Act).
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The names artists
bestow on their art can be part and parcel of the artistic message.”).
221 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2009) (specifying that “[w]ords and short phrases such as
names, titles, and slogans” are not copyrightable); Comins v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc.,
200 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (D. Md. 2002) (“[T]itles are not copyrightable.”).
222 See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“[T]his court’s case law prohibits proprietary rights for single book titles.”); In re Cooper,
254 F.2d 611, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (establishing the principle that a single title is
unregistrable as a trademark in the Patent and Trademark Office); Heirs of Estate of Jenkins
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d, 7 Fed. Appx. 270
(4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]itles of expressive works are treated differently from other trademarks,
in that titles, even if suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful, nonetheless require secondary meaning
to receive trademark protection, while other suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks do
not.”); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prods., B.V., 749 F. Supp. 1243, 1253
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) aff’d, 17 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1994). But see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, §
10:4.10 (criticizing special treatment for titles under trademark law).
223 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1989).
224 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he First
Amendment cannot permit anyone who cries “artist” to have carte blanche when it comes to
naming and advertising his or her works, art though it may be.”); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of
220
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reasonable jury might find that some titles represent entirely parasitic freeriding.225 Partly for these reasons, of the handful of expressive uses cases that
have rejected defendants’ arguments in the last fifteen years, several involve
titles.226
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the court skillfully danced around these competing
interests by requiring that a title have some relevance to the underlying artistic
message in order to qualify for special First Amendment treatment.227 Later
cases muddled the Rogers test, often reintroducing aspects of the likelihood of
confusion analysis.228 The draft bill adheres to the original and simpler Rogers
test, which remains independent from any analysis of consumer perception. It
would exclude from liability “[u]se of a mark in the title of a communicative
work . . . provided that such use is relevant to the underlying work.”229
Titles that are irrelevant to the work offer less communicative benefit and
may cause more injury through diversion of consumer attention, creating a
more realistic risk of false negatives. Thus they should be analyzed under
more fact-sensitive doctrines rather than the safe harbor. So, for example, in a
lawsuit by Rosa Parks against the hip-hop group OutKast over their song
entitled “Rosa Parks,” the defendants stipulated that “We (OutKast) never
peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.”); Masters Software, Inc. v.
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. C10-405RAJ, 2010 WL 2812947, at *11 (W.D. Wash. July
16, 2010) (holding that title of television program CakeBoss did not have First Amendment
defense against trademark for bakery management software program of the same name).
225 See Parks, 329 F.3d at 452-54.
226 See, e.g., Parks, 329 F.3d at 442 (reversing summary judgment for songwriters who
had used Rosa Parks’ name as the title of a song that included the phrase “everybody move
to the back of the bus” in its chorus); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214
F.3d 658, 668 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming trial court’s finding that defendant’s magazine title
“POLO” infringed plaintiff designer Ralph Lauren’s POLO marks because it tried to trade
on plaintiff’s “goodwill and reputation”); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc.,
35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728-29 (D. Minn. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction against use of
DAIRY QUEEN trademark in title of comedy film about Minnesota dairy princess
pageants).
227 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
228 See, e.g., Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 665 (asserting that in the Fifth Circuit as in
the Second, “the likelihood of confusion must be particularly compelling to outweigh the
First Amendment interests at stake” (quotation marks omitted)); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v.
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring the Rogers factors to be
applied in the context of the likelihood of confusion analysis); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (commingling Rogers’s
“explicitly misleading” test with likelihood of confusion); Films of Distinction, Inc. v.
Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077-78 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 n.11, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)),
(observing that the Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected the Rogers test by affirming a
preliminary injunction where there was sufficient uncertainty regarding likelihood of
confusion).
229 See infra Appendix, § 3.
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intended for the song to be about Rosa Parks or the civil rights movement.”230
In light of this admission, the court found itself unable to conclude that the title
was related to the song and it denied summary judgment under the Rogers
standard.231 On the same facts OutKast would disqualify itself from eligibility
for the categorical exclusion. Ultimately a factfinder could rule for OutKast
under more complex doctrines such as nominative use or the likelihood of
confusion test. And, of course, if the defendants made a persuasive argument
for artistic relevance rather than conceding the point, a court might find the
song eligible for the safe harbor.
A relevant title conveys important expression. As noted in Rogers, even a
relevant title might mislead some consumers.232 Nonetheless, the error cost
from these false negatives is outweighed by the greater seriousness of false
positives and, especially, by the administrative costs of mixing these cases up
in a full confusion analysis.
4.

News Reporting and News Commentary

Another overlapping safe harbor in the draft bill would immunize news
reporting and news commentary from liability for using trademarks.233 Similar
exclusions already exist under the current federal dilution statute as well as the
famously broad California right of publicity statute.234 Most uses of this sort
likely would occur within communicative works, and so would be covered by
the first main exclusion. I want to be sure, however, that courts do not focus
solely on the nature of the work and ignore the nature of the speech. As
unconventional media becomes more widespread, courts considering many
issues from trademarks to press shield laws to freedom of information rules are
struggling to fit new modes of communication into old categories.235 A
230

Parks, 329 F.3d at 452.
Id. at 463.
232 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001 (“[T]here is no doubt a risk that some people looking at the
title ‘Ginger and Fred’ might think the film was about Rogers and Astaire in a direct,
biographical sense. For those gaining that impression, the title is misleading.”).
233 See infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing new § 46(a)(3) of the Lanham Act).
The
language exempts “[u]se of a mark for purposes of news reporting or news commentary in
any medium, whether by professional journalists or otherwise . . . .” Id.
234 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2006) (excluding “[a]ll forms of news reporting and
news commentary” from liability); Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d) (West 1997) (excluding from
liability all uses “in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or
account”).
235 See, e.g., In re Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Perhaps more to the
point today, does the privilege also protect the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical
‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer posting on the World Wide Web
his best product to inform whoever happens to browse his way? If not, why not?”); Jones
Day v. Blockshopper LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623, 1627 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (examining
the plausibility of the likelihood of confusion test in the context of the defendant website
linking to pages internal to plaintiff’s website); In re Zyprexa, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 393-94
231
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clarifying sentence added to the end of the draft bill’s list of exclusions
explains, “More than one exclusion may apply to a particular use of a mark.”236
As with the other safe harbors, there will be tricky borderline cases. So, for
example, a web site that mixes some factual information or some discussion of
current events with outlandish parody might challenge a court attempting to
apply the exclusion.237 As with the others, however, the inevitable hard cases
do not destroy the rationale for simplifying adjudication of the easier cases.
5.

Trademarks in Political Speech

Finally, the draft bill tackles the separate issue of political uses of
trademarks.238 In light of the supremely important role of political speech in
modern discourse – and First Amendment jurisprudence – it makes sense to
create a safe harbor for this type of speech when it uses trademarked language
or imagery. Some litigated cases where defendants used trademarks in
political speech involved allusions to familiar marketing campaigns as a
convenient and colorful shorthand. So, for example, an opponent of former
Ohio Governor Bob Taft issued internet advertisements depicting a cartoon
duck with the Governor’s head squawking “TaftQuack!” when “ducking”
questions, modeled on the well-known television commercials for the
insurance company AFLAC in which a duck repeatedly “quacks the
company’s name in a distinctive, nasal tone.”239 In another case, presidential
hopeful Ralph Nader ran campaign commercials parodying the famous
MasterCard PRICELESS campaign.240 Another recurring situation involves
the nominative use of a trademarked name or logo as an adjunct to stating a
political message. So, for example, protestors aiming to prevent the closing of
a Brach’s candy factory, or the opening of a prison in the Olympic Village
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, C.A. No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445, at
*5-7 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007). See generally Michael Russo, Note, Are Bloggers
Representative of the News Media Under the Freedom of Information Act?, 40 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 225 (2006).
236 See infra Appendix, § 3.
237 See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308-13 (2008)
(describing Wal-Mart’s trademark suit against critic selling “Walocaust” merchandise that
likened the retailer to the Nazi regime).
238 See infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing new § 46(a)(4) of the Lanham Act). The language
exempts:
Use of a mark in speech directly related to any election, ballot initiative, or political
issue, except that this exclusion shall not apply to (i) the use of a mark directly in
support of the solicitation or collection of financial contributions or other primarily
commercial activities or (ii) the use of a mark that is the name (or a close variant
thereof) of a person or entity that engages in a significant quantity of political speech.
Id.
239 Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
240 See MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1046, 1047-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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from the 1980 Olympic Games, were sued to enjoin the use of the BRACH’S
and OLYMPICS trademarks.241 (The defendants lost the somewhat older
BRACH’S and OLYMPICS cases.242) All of these examples led to litigation,
but the potential chilling effect on political discourse influences pre-litigation
behavior as well.
Political speech will, of course, need to be defined with care. In the
proposed bill, the activity surrounding the use of the mark must be “directly
related to any election, ballot initiative, or political issue” and the use cannot
be “directly in support of the solicitation or collection of financial
contributions.”243 These limitations will exclude uses that some might argue
should not be infringement. Organizations that, for example, sell buttons and
t-shirts with messages to support their work will not enjoy immunity for uses
of a third party’s mark on that paraphernalia. Remember, however, that this is
only a judgment about which uses of a mark should be entirely insulated from
liability without regard to confusion. The defendant in such cases may be able
to defeat the plaintiff’s prima facie case and, as I argue below, should have a
presumption in its favor for this analysis.244
Deceptively confusing uses of marks that are themselves political in nature
could infect both the marketplace of ideas and the market for more material
support such as financial contributions. Indeed, the purposes behind our
special solicitude for political speech would be harmed, not helped, by
immunizing these sorts of infringements. Judge Pierre Leval confronted this
issue in a case where a splinter group from Ross Perot’s UNITED WE STAND
AMERICA movement wanted to continue using the name in competition with
the national party, as “United We Stand America (New York),” or
UWSANY.245 Rejecting an argument that the First Amendment protected this
use of a mark, Judge Leval observed:
UWSANY is not using the phrase “United We Stand America” for an
expressive purpose such as commentary, comedy, parody, news reporting
or criticism, but instead as a means to associate itself with the political
movement that sponsored the Ross Perot campaign. In other words, it is
using the slogan as a mark, and using it to suggest the same source
identification as plaintiffs. This is precisely the use that is reserved by the
Lanham Act to the owner of the mark. Even assuming that UWSANY
might communicate its political message more effectively by

241

See Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal., 856 F. Supp. 472, 474
(N.D. Ill. 1994); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112,
1114-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
242 Brach, 856 F. Supp. at 477; Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F. Supp. at 1126.
243 See infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing new § 46(a)(3) of the Lanham Act).
244 See infra Part III.C.
245 United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 88 (2d
Cir. 1997).
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appropriating [the national organization’s mark], such appropriation
would cause significant consumer confusion.246
To address such situations, the draft bill would not confer a political speech
exemption for using the name of a person or entity that also engages in a
significant quantity of political speech. The use of the UNITED WE STAND
AMERICA mark in a communicative work, or news commentary, would of
course remain exempt under other safe harbors. Its use beyond those
boundaries, however, would not qualify for a categorical exemption. Rather,
because such a use may give rise to false negatives and implicate the core
functions of trademarks, it requires a more searching review, possibly
extending to the likelihood of confusion analysis.
C.

Other Changes to Decisionmaking Structure

The safe harbors described in Part III.B represent the proposal’s most
significant departure from existing trademark law. The remainder of the
discussion here notes a few other changes to decisionmaking structure that
might also improve the handling of expressive use cases and explains how the
reforms proposed in this Article interact with other free speech protections in
trademark law.
First, as this Article has emphasized from the outset, a menu of categorical
exemptions is just one part of reform and not a silver bullet capable of solving
the problem by itself.247 The draft bill also would leave intact the existing
doctrinal tools for addressing trademark fair use situations. The principal
flaws in these doctrines arise from their complexity and sluggishness, not from
their outcomes. Where a case does not qualify for a categorical exemption, it
may still escape liability through mechanisms such as § 33(b)(4) fair use or
various judicially-developed First Amendment defenses. Courts may find,
particularly in certain easy cases, that they can apply a familiar test quickly –
perhaps more quickly than a safe harbor that they never considered before. In
addition, the repeal of existing provisions creates needless complexity in the
reform bill itself. Courts that have adopted a special test for nominative use,248
for example, could continue to use it provided they reconcile it with the
rebuttable presumption in the draft bill.
Maintaining existing doctrines also resists inevitable pressure to muddy the
safe harbors in order to protect important forms of speech, even if they are not
appropriate for categorical exemptions. While comparative advertising is
highly valuable for enabling competition and informing consumers,
immunizing it under a sweeping definition would create a danger of false
negatives where alleged comparative advertising actually caused considerable
246

Id. at 93 (citation omitted).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
248 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir.
2005); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800-05 (9th Cir. 2002); Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1152-55 (9th Cir. 2002).
247
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confusion. Similarly, depending on the circumstances, nominative references
to a mark in commercial contexts could implicate the appropriate goals of
trademark law. Finally, while parody might be the quintessential fair use
scenario, in situations beyond communicative works it raises complex issues
that cannot be resolved with a categorical rule.249
In a similar way, categorical exemptions can and should work in harmony
with other reform proposals rather than presenting either-or choices. Perhaps
in the future trademark law will presume materiality in fewer cases than it does
today, and apply nominative use and First Amendment defenses, and exclude
certain types of uses from liability categorically. This approach allows the
pursuit of multiple reform strategies rather than requiring consensus on just
one. It also helps to answer concerns that categorical exemptions might come
to be seen as the only fair uses allowed, because developing the safe harbors as
one part of a larger scheme reduces this danger.
Cases that do not fall within one of the safe harbors or any of the existing or
proposed fair use doctrines would move to the traditional analysis of the
plaintiff’s burden to prove likelihood of confusion. These would be less easy
cases requiring more fact-specific considerations. They might include some of
the valuable speech noted above, such as comparative advertising and parody.
In these cases, the elevated risk of Type II error justifies somewhat higher
administrative costs and the multiplicity of possible relevant factual
considerations makes it impossible to formulate a simple rule ex ante.
Nevertheless, an adjustment of the likelihood of confusion analysis is in
order when speech is at stake. As noted above, the confusion analysis often
remains blind to other normative values at stake, particularly free speech.250
Because the traditional multifactor test has such high sensitivity to avoiding
false negatives, but none at all to false positives (and very little to
administrative costs), expressive interests get lost in the analysis. Some courts
turn to a special First Amendment test to address this problem, but they apply
it inconsistently.251 Furthermore, because these courts evaluate confusion in
full and then weigh speech interests in full, they actually require even more
fact-intensive analysis than the traditional multifactor test.252
249 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th
Cir. 2007) (employing several multi-factor tests to determine whether defendant’s “Chewy
Vuiton” line of dog toys was parody and whether it impaired distinctiveness, caused
tarnishment, or was counterfeiting).
250 See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text .
251 Compare, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir.
2003) (applying the Rogers test and holding that “the public interest in free artistic
expression greatly outweighs its interest in potential consumer confusion”), with Tommy
Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“The First Amendment affords no protection because trademark law permissibly regulates
misleading commercial speech.” (citation omitted)).
252 See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir.
1993); McGeveran, supra note 2, at 102-03.
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The draft bill instead would create a presumption that functions like a
“thumb on the scale” weighing against a finding of likelihood of confusion for
communicative uses.253 As with the safe harbors, the bill would define these in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine, as uses that
primarily support communication of information, ideas, or expression beyond
merely proposing a commercial transaction.”254 The bill then provides an
illustrative list of such uses, which includes nominative uses of a mark,
comparative advertising, parody and criticism, and use of a mark to promote a
communicative work.
Specifying particular examples of uses entitled to the presumption presents
some dangers, because courts might convert the illustrative open list into a
closed one, as critics argue has happened in copyright fair use.255 However,
the broad standard laid out for communicative works, the explicit instructions
to the contrary (“shall include, but are not limited to”256), and presumably
legislative history, would all underscore that courts should rely on normal
principles of statutory construction to interpret these examples as setting a
floor and not a ceiling.257 It would be improper to apply the expressio unius
canon here, because the proposed subsection does not limit the presumption to
these situations and because doing so contradicts the overall language of the
subsection and the bill as a whole.258
A rebuttable presumption is not a guarantee of victory. Nor does it simplify
the litigation as much as an exclusion would. But because the situations
outside the safe harbors present greater risks from false negatives,
administrative costs inevitably must increase to reduce those risks.
Finally, the draft bill includes a provision that can only be hortatory, but is
important enough to state explicitly: courts should “endeavor to adjudicate
speech-related exclusions, presumptions, and defenses . . . as soon as
practicable after the issue has been raised by a party.”259 Routine judicial
management decisions prolong litigation and increase costs in ways that
contribute to the chilling effect on fair use.260 While judges and other legal
actors move very quickly to resolve urgent First Amendment issues such as

253

See infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing new § 46(b) of the Lanham Act).
Id.; see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
255 See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 670-72 (2001) (arguing that minimum numerical guidelines often
transform into maximum standards); Rothman, supra note 3, at 1918-21 (describing and
critiquing the “Classroom Guidelines”).
256 Infra Appendix, § 3.
257 See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 160, at 1524-28.
258 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 582-83 (2000).
259 See infra Appendix, § 3 (proposing new § 46(c) of the Lanham Act).
260 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 1221-23.
254

2320

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90: 2267

prior restraints,261 they do not act with the same speed in trademark-related
speech cases. Efforts to speed judicial pace may prove as quixotic as attempts
to make baseball games move more quickly,262 but the plea still should be
attempted. Courts should entertain arguments about defensive doctrines as
soon as they are raised. Bundling these issues together with other facets of the
case defeats the goal of separating fair use from the elements of the prima facie
case.263
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article extends beyond advocating the particular
reforms embodied in the draft bill. It aims also to reorient discussion about the
proper response to conflicts between trademark law and free speech.
Traditionally, trademark law has been nearly allergic to simple defenses, per se
exceptions, or safe harbors. Much of its design assumes that avoidance of
consumer confusion is imperative, even if high administrative costs and
unpredictability result. The same tendency destroys most of the value of
existing trademark fair use doctrine.
Effective reform will balance administrative costs and error costs properly
and, as a result, will embrace clearer rules over ambiguous standards. It will
allow defendants to raise fair use claims without becoming entangled in the
likelihood of confusion analysis. It also will continue to provide robust
trademark protection in situations where a false negative might cause
significant harm. The proposed bill included in the Appendix is an example of
such a reform effort. More important than its particulars, however, is its
framework. By focusing on the decisionmaking structure and not just on
results, this approach addresses the real threat that trademark law poses to free
speech today: a chilling effect that never appears in the courthouse at all.

261

See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (imposing constitutional
requirements for speedy determinations in prior restraint cases).
262 See Kelsie Smith, Ticked Off?: Baseball Is Studying Ways of Speeding Up the Pace of
Its Games. Suggestions Abound., ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 30, 2010, at C1.
263 See supra Part II.C.
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APPENDIX: THE DRAFT LEGISLATION
A BILL
To amend the Trademark Act of 1946 to improve protection for free speech.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Trademark Fair Use
Reform Act.”
SECTION 2. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION IN TRADEMARK
DILUTION CASES
Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125) is amended by
striking
subsection
(c)(3)
and
inserting
the
following:
“(3) Exclusions for Noncommercial Use or Comparative Advertising. In
addition to any uses protected from liability by other defenses or exclusions
available under this Act, including the exclusions set forth in section 46 of
this Act, use of a mark shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection if such use: (i) supports
communication of information, ideas, or expression beyond merely
proposing a commercial transaction or (ii) facilitates advertising or
promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services.”
SECTION 3. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION
The Trademark Act of 1946 is amended by inserting the following new
section after section 45:
“§ 46. Free Speech Protection
(a) Exclusions
The following shall not be actionable under this Act:
(1) Communicative works—Use of a mark within the body of a work
when the work has as its primary purpose the communication of
information, ideas, or expression, beyond proposing a commercial
transaction. Examples of such communicative works include, but are
not limited to: books, films, newspapers, magazines, web sites, musical
compositions, and video games;
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(2) Titles—Use of a mark in the title of a communicative work as
defined in § 46(a)(1), provided that such use is relevant to the
underlying work;
(3) News—Use of a mark for purposes of news reporting or news
commentary in any medium, whether by professional journalists or
otherwise;
(4) Political speech—Use of a mark in speech directly related to any
election, ballot initiative, or political issue, except that this exclusion
shall not apply to (i) the use of a mark directly in support of the
solicitation or collection of financial contributions or (ii) the use of a
mark that is the name (or a close variant thereof) of a person or entity
that engages in a significant quantity of political speech.
More than one exclusion may apply to a particular use of a mark.
(b) Rebuttable Presumption
Courts shall apply a presumption that uses of a mark are not likely to cause
actionable confusion of consumers under this Act if they primarily support
communication of information, ideas, or expression beyond merely
proposing a commercial transaction. This presumption is rebuttable if the
party claiming rights in the mark presents evidence that such use is likely to
cause substantial actionable confusion of a significant number of consumers
that persists beyond momentary confusion or initial interest confusion. Uses
of a mark entitled to this presumption shall include, but are not limited to:
(1) Nominative Uses—Use of the mark to identify or refer to the mark
(or to goods, services, or entities associated with the mark);
(2) Comparative Advertising—Use of the mark in advertising or
promotion that compares the mark (or goods, services, or entities
associated with the mark) with other products;
(3) Use of a Mark for Commentary—Use of the mark in connection
with parody, satire, comment, criticism, or similar purposes;
(4) Use of a Mark to Promote a Communicative Work—The
reproduction in advertising or promotion of any use of a mark that is
otherwise excluded from liability under section 46(a)(1).
(c) Procedural Matters
Courts shall endeavor to adjudicate speech-related exclusions, presumptions,
and defenses in this section and section 43(c) as soon as practicable after the
issue has been raised by a party.”

